

The FinCEN Artificial Intelligence System: Identifying Potential Money Laundering from Reports of Large Cash Transactions*

**Ted E. Senator, Henry G. Goldberg, Jerry Wooton,
Matthew A. Cottini, A.F. Umar Khan**, Christina D. Klinger,
Winston M. Llamas, Michael P. Marrone, and Raphael W.H. Wong**

U.S. Department of the Treasury – Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
2070 Chain Bridge Road, Vienna, VA 22182
senator@snap.org, goldberg@itd.nrl.navy.mil

Abstract

The FinCEN* Artificial Intelligence System (FAIS) links and evaluates reports of large cash transactions to identify potential money laundering. The objective of FAIS is to discover previously unknown, potential high value leads for possible investigation. FAIS integrates intelligent human and software agents in a cooperative discovery task on a very large data space. It is a complex system incorporating several aspects of AI technology, including rule-based reasoning and a blackboard. FAIS consists of an underlying database (which functions as a blackboard), a graphical user interface, and several pre-processing and analysis modules. FAIS has been in operational use at FinCEN since March 1993 by a dedicated group of analysts, processing approximately 200,000 transactions per week, and during which time over 400 investigative support reports corresponding to over \$1 billion in potential laundered funds have been developed. FAIS's unique analytical power arises primarily from a transformation of view of the underlying data from a transaction oriented perspective to a subject (i.e., person or organization) oriented perspective.

Introduction

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is a relatively new agency (founded in 1990) of the U.S. Treasury Department whose mission is to establish, oversee, and implement policies to prevent and detect money laundering, in support of federal, state, and local law enforcement. A key data source available to FinCEN is reports of large cash transactions made to Treasury

according to terms of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)¹. FinCEN has developed a system, called the FinCEN Artificial Intelligence System (FAIS), which links and evaluates all reported transactions for indications of suspicious activity characteristic of money laundering, with the objective of identifying previously unknown, potential high value leads for follow-up investigation and, if warranted, prosecution (*The Wall Street Journal* 1993).

FAIS integrates intelligent software and human agents in a cooperative discovery task on a very large data space. It is a complex system incorporating several aspects of AI technology, including rule-based reasoning and a blackboard. FAIS consists of an underlying database, a graphical user interface (GUI), and several pre-processing and analysis modules. The database functions as a blackboard and is implemented in Sybase. The GUI is implemented in Neuron Data's Open Interface. The suspiciousness evaluation module is a rule-based reasoner implemented in Neuron Data's Nexpert Object (now called Smart Elements). Alta Analytics' NetMap provides a link analysis module. Other FAIS programs, which asynchronously load and pre-process the data, are written in SQL and C. FAIS runs on a network of Sun servers and workstations under the UNIX operating system.

FAIS has been in operational use at FinCEN since March 1993 by a dedicated group of analysts, processing approximately 200,000 transactions per week. FAIS operates in two modes: Data-Driven and User-Directed. Over 400 investigative support reports have resulted from using the system, reflecting transactions on the order of \$1 billion in potential laundered funds. FAIS's development is continuing, to remain current with changes in money laundering techniques and statutes, to increase its effectiveness, to add additional features, and to support FinCEN's policy and regulatory responsibilities in addition to detection and investigative support.

FAIS's unique analytical power arises primarily from a transformation of view of the underlying data from a

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**Current Address: FC Business Systems, 5205 Leesburg Pike, #700, Falls Church, VA 22041

¹12 U.S.C. sections 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959, and 31 U.S.C. sections 5311-5326.

transaction oriented perspective to a subject (i.e., person or organization) oriented perspective. FAIS enables a process that was infeasible without automation, both because of the data volume and the need to link together related transactions prior to evaluation. FAIS permits analysts to focus on significant items of interest in the database, enabling more detailed and complex analyses on these items. FAIS allows law enforcement to derive increased value from the reported data, to ensure that all reported transactions are evaluated at least once, and to reduce the likelihood of missing any significant reported illicit financial activity.

Task Description

The most common motivation for criminal behavior is profit. The larger the criminal organization, the greater the profit. By disrupting the ability to profit, law enforcement can focus on a vulnerable aspect of large criminal organizations. Money laundering is a complex process of placing the profit, usually cash, from illicit activity into the legitimate financial system, with the intent of obscuring the source, ownership, or use of the funds. Money laundering, previously viewed as an ancillary offense, is today a primary offense in its own right. Money laundering makes it possible for drug dealers, terrorists, arms dealers, and others to operate and expand their criminal enterprises. Left unchecked, it can erode the integrity of financial institutions. Money laundering typically involves a multitude of transactions, perhaps by distinct individuals, into multiple accounts with different owners at different banks and other financial institutions. Detection of large scale money laundering schemes requires the ability to reconstruct these patterns of transactions by linking together potentially related transactions, and then to distinguish the legitimate sets of transactions from the illegitimate ones. This technique of finding relationships between elements of information, called link analysis, is the primary analytical technique used in law enforcement intelligence (Andrews and Peterson 1990).

To combat money laundering, the BSA requires reporting of cash transactions in excess of \$10,000. This record keeping preserves a financial trail for investigators to follow and allows the Government to systematically scrutinize large cash transactions. These transactions are reported by financial institutions, by casinos, and by individuals entering or leaving the country. Transactions at financial institutions, which include traditional institutions such as banks and non-traditional institutions such as Casas de Cambio, are reported on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 4789, the Currency Transaction Report (CTR), which is partially reproduced

as figure 1.² Individuals entering or leaving the country are required to file a CMIR, or Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments, with the U.S. Customs Service. CMIR's are also required where cash or monetary instruments (e.g., traveler's checks) are shipped into or out of the country. Casinos file the Currency Transaction Report by Casinos (CTRC), which is a variant of the basic CTR.

4789 May, September 1991 Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service		Currency Transaction Report ▶ File a separate report for each transaction. ▶ Please type or print. ▶ For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see page 3. ▶ Complete all applicable parts—See instructions.		OMB No. 1545-0183 Expires 1-30-94
1 Check appropriate boxes if: <input type="checkbox"/> a. Amounts over \$10,000 <input type="checkbox"/> b. Exemption limit exceeded <input type="checkbox"/> c. Suspicious transaction				
Part I Identity of individual who conducted this transaction with the financial institution 2 If more than one individual is involved, see instructions and check here: <input type="checkbox"/>				
3 Reason items 4-15 below are not fully completed (check all applicable boxes): <input type="checkbox"/> a. Armored car service (name) <input type="checkbox"/> b. Multiple transactions (see instructions) <input type="checkbox"/> c. Mail deposit/withdrawal <input type="checkbox"/> d. Night deposit or ATM transaction				
4 Last name <input type="text"/> 5 First name <input type="text"/> 6 Middle initial <input type="text"/> 7 Social security number <input type="text"/>				
8 Address (number, street, and apt. or suite no.) <input type="text"/> 9 Occupation, profession, or business <input type="text"/>				
10 City <input type="text"/> 11 State <input type="text"/> 12 ZIP code <input type="text"/> 13 Country (if not U.S.) <input type="text"/> 14 Date of birth (see instructions) <input type="text"/>				
15 Method used to verify identity: <input type="checkbox"/> a. Describe identification <input type="text"/> <input type="checkbox"/> b. Number <input type="text"/>				
Part II Person (see General Instructions) on whose behalf this transaction was conducted 16 If this transaction was conducted on behalf of more than one person, see instructions and check here: <input type="checkbox"/>				
17 This person is an: <input type="checkbox"/> individual or <input type="checkbox"/> organization. 18 If must, describe business or other 3rd party account (see instructions and check here) <input type="checkbox"/>				
19 Individual's last name or Organization's name <input type="text"/> 20 First name <input type="text"/> 21 Middle initial <input type="text"/> 22 Social security number <input type="text"/>				
23 Alien identification: <input type="checkbox"/> a. Describe identification <input type="text"/> <input type="checkbox"/> b. Number <input type="text"/>				
24 Address (number, street, and apt. or suite no.) <input type="text"/> 25 Occupation, profession, or business <input type="text"/>				
26 City <input type="text"/> 27 State <input type="text"/> 28 ZIP code <input type="text"/> 29 Country (if not U.S.) <input type="text"/> 30 Date of birth (see instructions) <input type="text"/>				
Part III Types of accounts and numbers affected by transaction (if more than one of the same type, use additional spaces provided below) 31 <input type="checkbox"/> a. Savings <input type="checkbox"/> b. Securities <input type="checkbox"/> c. CD/Money market <input type="checkbox"/> d. CD/Money market <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> e. Checking <input type="checkbox"/> f. Loan <input type="checkbox"/> g. Other (specify) <input type="text"/>				
Part IV Type of transaction. Check applicable boxes to describe transaction 32 <input type="checkbox"/> a. Currency exchange (currency for currency)				
33 CASH IN: <input type="checkbox"/> a. CD/Money market purchased <input type="checkbox"/> b. For wire transfer <input type="checkbox"/> c. Check cashed <input type="checkbox"/> d. CD/Money market redeemed <input type="checkbox"/> e. Security purchased <input type="checkbox"/> f. Receipt from abroad <input type="checkbox"/> g. Security redeemed <input type="checkbox"/> h. From wire transfer <input type="checkbox"/> i. Check purchased <input type="checkbox"/> j. Other (specify) <input type="text"/>				
34 CASH OUT: <input type="checkbox"/> a. Check cashed <input type="checkbox"/> b. From wire transfer <input type="checkbox"/> c. Withdrawal <input type="checkbox"/> d. Other (specify) <input type="text"/>				
35 Total amount of currency transaction (in U.S. dollar equivalent) (always round up) <input type="text"/> 36 Amount in item 35 in U.S. \$100 bills or higher (in U.S. dollar equivalent) <input type="text"/> 37 Date of transaction (see instructions) <input type="text"/>				
38 If other than U.S. currency is involved, please furnish the following information: <input type="checkbox"/> a. Exchange made (for or from U.S. currency) <input type="checkbox"/> b. Country <input type="text"/> c. Amount of currency (in U.S. dollar equivalent) \$ <input type="text"/> d. Amount of currency (in U.S. dollar equivalent) \$ <input type="text"/>				
39 If a negotiable instrument or wire transfer was involved in the transaction, please furnish the following information and check this box (see instructions): <input type="checkbox"/>				
40 If negotiable instrument involved, <input type="checkbox"/> a. Number of negotiable instruments involved <input type="text"/> b. Total amount of all negotiable instruments and all wire transfers (in U.S. dollar equivalent) \$ <input type="text"/>				
Part V Financial institution where transaction took place 41 <input type="checkbox"/> a. Bank (enter code number from instructions here) <input type="text"/> <input type="checkbox"/> b. Savings and loan association <input type="checkbox"/> c. Credit union <input type="checkbox"/> d. Securities broker/dealer <input type="checkbox"/> e. Other (specify) <input type="text"/>				
42 Name of financial institution <input type="text"/> 43 Address where the transaction occurred (see instructions) <input type="text"/> 44 Employer identification number <input type="text"/>				
45 City <input type="text"/> 46 State <input type="text"/> 47 ZIP code <input type="text"/> 48 MICR number <input type="text"/> 49 Social security number <input type="text"/>				
49 If this is a multiple transaction, <input type="checkbox"/> a. Number of transactions <input type="text"/> <input type="checkbox"/> b. Number of branches <input type="text"/>				
50 Signature (print name) <input type="text"/> 51 Time <input type="text"/> 52 Date <input type="text"/> 53 Approving official (signature) <input type="text"/> 54 Date <input type="text"/> 55 Telephone number <input type="text"/>				

Figure 1: CTR Form

Approximately 10 million transactions are reported each year, with over 90% being CTR's. In 1993, these transactions amounted to approximately \$500 billion. These amounts have been continually increasing, as illustrated in figure 2. Forms are entered into the Treasury's Financial Database, which is maintained in two

²Cash transactions at non-financial businesses are reported under 26 U.S.C. section 6050I to the IRS on Form 8300, the Report of Cash Payments Over \$10,000 Received in a Trade or Business. As of November 1992, law enforcement agencies other than the IRS no longer have access to this information. FAIS is designed to accommodate these reports if they once again become more widely available to law enforcement.




Figure 2: CTR Filings

mainframe hosted database systems, the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) operated by the U.S. Customs Service and the Currency Banking Regulatory System operated by the IRS. These systems are used by law enforcement for responses to general or specific queries. These systems are extremely useful for supporting existing investigations and for strategic studies of money laundering and cash transactions. They can not, however, search, sort, or link the forms according to complex sets of criteria.

The data reported on the forms are subject to errors, uncertainties, and inconsistencies that affect both identification and transaction information. Simple data entry errors may be due to the difficulties in reading handwritten forms or to keypunching errors. More complex difficulties arise from other aspects of the forms. Free text fields, such as that containing a business type or occupation, are not standardized, resulting in a variety of descriptions. The variety of linguistic and ethnic types, especially on CMIR forms and for personal names, also makes the data difficult to interpret. All fields are not filled out on all forms. The filer can accept any of several forms of identification (e.g., social security number, driver's license number, etc.). The information provided on each form type is not completely equivalent. All these factors make it extremely difficult to reconstruct the patterns of transactions.

Because of the volume of forms received, the number and variety of fields on the forms, and the quality of the entries on the forms, it is infeasible for human analysts to review all forms even on an individual unlinked basis. Linking the forms together to review sets of related transactions for indications of money laundering is impossible without the use of advanced computing

technology. Since the number of sets of potentially related transactions scales at least exponentially with the number of forms³, the ability to prune the search space intelligently by creating the most meaningful sets of linkages is required to evaluate realistically all forms for purposes of detecting money laundering.⁴ Additionally, the detection of money laundering is a complex task requiring years of experience and judgment by well-trained analysts, due in large part to the lack of both formal domain models and

normative data regarding the cash economy. These factors all contributed to the belief that AI was a necessary component of FAIS. Finally, and perhaps most important, a successful predecessor system to FAIS had been developed by the U.S. Customs Service in the mid-1980's. This system, called the Customs AI System (CAIS), utilized rule-based reasoning for the evaluation of suspiciousness. It served as a proof-of-concept that this AI technique could be applied effectively to the task of detecting money laundering from BSA transactions.

The primary task of FAIS is the automated review of *all* BSA filings to generate potential leads. The expertise required for the FAIS task is the ability to detect potential indications of money laundering in the *BSA database*, as distinct from the (at least as important) ability to detect money laundering based on other clues. BSA suspiciousness analysis may be thought of as the incremental process of accumulating information about the subjects in the database to allow analysts and investigators to focus on the most suspicious activity. FAIS assists analysts to focus on the most suspicious subjects, accounts, and transactions identified from BSA filings.

The process of evaluating BSA filings for indications of suspiciousness begins with the linking and evaluation of BSA transactions by FAIS, and continues with the analysis of information generated by FAIS, and provision of that information to a law enforcement agency with

³Depending on the assumptions regarding what types of linkages are allowed, the complexity can scale proportionally to the number of partitions or subsets.

⁴As in most AI applications with large search spaces, massive computing power is another potential solution.




Figure 3: FAIS Architecture

jurisdiction in the matter. It could ultimately lead to indictment and conviction of the violator, as well as the seizure by the Government of illicitly acquired assets. This process occurs in the larger context of FinCEN's investigative support work. Once the leads are generated from FAIS, other FinCEN systems, which are used primarily to collate and analyze financial and law enforcement intelligence information to develop existing cases based on known leads provided by client agencies in support of existing investigations, are also used to further the investigative support process.

Application Description

This section describes FAIS: how it works, what it is, and how it employs AI techniques and concepts. Figure 3 depicts the FAIS architecture and its two modes of operation, data-driven and user-directed. The key functional modules of FAIS are:

- the underlying database
- the data load programs
- the database extension updating programs
- the suspiciousness evaluation programs

- the link analysis tool, and
- the interactive query interface (IQI).

Other programs and packages that are available in the Sun environment (for example, the Applix office automation package, consisting of a word processor, spreadsheet, e-mail, and database) are sometimes also thought of as part of FAIS, as they have full cut-and-paste interoperability with the FAIS components.

Concept of Operations

FAIS operates in two modes: data-driven and user-directed. Data-driven operation is the regular process of loading, linking, and evaluating new information as it is received. User-directed analysis is ad-hoc, initiated in response to a specific project or task. Users regularly review and analyze the end product of the data-driven operation, i.e., a list of subjects sorted by scores. Most of the operational load on the system is the data-driven processing of all transactions. Because data-driven functions operate on all information received by the system, the complexity of the processing is limited by available computing resources. In contrast, user-directed

processing operates on selected information that is already determined to be of interest, so more complex analyses are possible in this mode.

A system operator is responsible for performing the data-driven operations. Data tapes are received from the U.S. Customs Service Data Center in Newington, VA. Tapes are copied and combined to 8 mm cassettes for loading and retention. Data are then loaded into FAIS. The load programs perform consolidation, the process of creating clusters (i.e., subjects or accounts) by linking transactions according to common personal, business, or account identification information. Database extension programs are run to create or update summary information associated with the clusters. The analysis rules are run to update the suspiciousness rating of clusters. These data-driven processes all create additional information in the database. These programs are run asynchronously, depending on when tapes are received, how much data is on them, and system and operator availability.

Users enter the system through a main menu in which they select either user-directed or data-driven analysis. In user-directed mode, users set specific criteria for sets of transactions and the system retrieves all transactions meeting the specified criteria. In data-driven mode, users retrieve sets of transactions based on the data-driven suspiciousness scores. They can continue by finding all other transactions for these subjects or accounts, or by following a trail of linkages by looking for other subjects and accounts that are linked to a specified subject or account. This process can continue iteratively, as an analyst follows a trail of linked subjects, accounts, and transactions. At any stage, a user can load sets of transactions into the NetMap link analysis tool for further analysis. A user can also create new subjects by combining system identified subjects, which is useful if the system did not consolidate two subjects that the user believes to be identical or if two subjects do business as a single entity (such as a husband and wife), and can re-evaluate suspiciousness for these user-generated subjects. A user can directly access the suspiciousness evaluation to determine which rules fired for a particular subject or account, getting what is essentially an explanation of the suspiciousness score for the subject or account. Finally, users can also utilize the Nexpert graphical mode and alter values or rules to analyze hypothetical situations of interest.

Architecture

This section describes the structure and operations of each of the components of FAIS.

FAIS Database. Sybase is the standard FinCEN database management system (DBMS). No evaluation was

performed to consider alternatives to Sybase for FAIS; it was decided that any potential advantages of another DBMS for FAIS would be outweighed by the disadvantages of having multiple DBMS in a single organization, including the difficulties of sharing data between FAIS and other FinCEN intelligence information systems in a multiple DBMS environment.

The FAIS data model is based on three fundamental concepts: transactions, subjects, and accounts. It includes all fields from all BSA form types, unifying those fields common to multiple form types. There are approximately 120 fields, about half of which are filled in on any given form. It is designed to support a blackboard system architecture, where different modules asynchronously read to and write from the shared data repository. The FAIS data model also supports three levels of belief – "reported", "accepted", and "hypothesized" – which correspond to three different levels of access and control of the data, as depicted in figure 4.




Figure 4: Levels of Belief

Transactions enter the database directly as they are reported, with no interpretation of the data by FAIS. The data is restructured, however, from a model based solely on transactions into the FAIS model based on transactions, subjects, and accounts. Subjects and accounts are abstractions which result from a process of consolidation whereby similar identification information is used to group transactions into "clusters" (Goldberg and Senator 1995). The transformation from transactions to clusters is based on identification information reported on the transaction. Because several subjects can appear on a transaction, a transaction may be part of several clusters. The transformation from transactions to subjects or accounts is depicted conceptually in figure 5. The data-driven processing may be viewed as a compilation of this transformation of view from transactions to subjects and accounts, making this view available on all the data upon user request. Having both these views available




Figure 5: Transformation of Perspective

simultaneously is the major increase in analytical insight provided by FAIS to the users.

The subject and account clusters, and any aggregate or summary data computed from these sets of transactions, represent the next level of belief (i.e., accepted) and are computed according to conservative, proven algorithms upon which the entire system depends. This summary information about clusters or transactions is referred to as the database extensions. They include derived attributes necessary for the evaluation of suspiciousness, the results of the data-driven suspiciousness evaluations, various "flags" containing information such as subject status, and additional information discovered by analysts in user-directed mode, including additional linkages between clusters. The final level of belief (i.e., hypothesized) is reserved for higher level abstractions (e.g., cases, patterns) and for alternative subject and account consolidations.

The entire database is implemented in the relational model, although slightly de-normalized to provide more efficient retrieval of certain types of data. The FAIS database consists of 40 Sybase tables, and currently occupies approximately 20 GBytes.

Data Load Programs. The data load programs are a hybrid program of C (9K lines) and Sybase SQL stored procedure code (4K lines), optimized for performance. The most interesting activity in this module is the consolidation of subjects and accounts. These consolidations are based on a set of heuristics developed by knowledge engineering. This knowledge is presently coded into the program in two SQL stored procedures that use database searches to locate reasonable matches to the

input identification data. They are implemented as hard-coded procedures not only to optimize performance but also because the cost of executing alternative consolidations upon the entire database is prohibitive.

Database Extension Updating Programs. The database extension programs compute summary information about clusters. The major activity in this module is the creation of an aggregate and summary model of the set of transactions underlying each subject or account. These are the derived data fields that the suspiciousness evaluation rules use and represent one of the major areas for future

improvement in the system. This summary information consists of numerical aggregates, such as number or monetary value of filings per time period, and other non-numerical information, such as locations or occupations associated with subjects. This module consists of two small C programs (1K lines) using a general database access library written in C (8K lines) with SQL stored procedures for only the most rudimentary operations (200 lines). Any additional features that we decide to compute in the future require only minor modifications.

Suspiciousness Evaluation. The suspiciousness evaluation module of FAIS contains the major expert rule based components of the system. Neuron Data's Nexpert Object shell was chosen for this task. Nexpert provides the GUI for both the development and execution of rule bases. This GUI provides a built in rudimentary explanation facility, allowing users to easily see which rules fired and how each rule contributed to the result. It also allows properly trained analysts to tinker with or even add to the rule bases to answer "what-if" types of questions, which in turn assists in the knowledge engineering process. Some other useful features of Nexpert for this application are a quick backward chaining inference engine, ability to import data directly from database systems (including Sybase), portability between all standard desktop and minicomputers, and a comprehensive API that allows a Nexpert rule base to become a component of a larger system, rather than trying to fit everything into the Nexpert model.

Figure 6: Data Driven Mode

The initial implementation of the suspiciousness evaluation in FAIS draws almost entirely on the rule bases developed in CAIS. CAIS consisted of 6 distinct rule sets with 439 rules implemented in the Knowledge Engineering System (KES) for the Apollo (now Hewlett Packard) computer system. These six rule sets computed suspiciousness for individual CTR transactions, individual CMIR transactions, the CTR activity of a bank account, the CTR activity of an individual or business, the CMIR activity of an individual or business, and the combined CTR and CMIR activity of an individual or business. The semantic equivalent of the CAIS rules has been re-implemented for FAIS. This process was fairly straightforward because both development tools use similar models of expert system technology. Some simplifications of the rule sets were made resulting in FAIS's having just 336 rules with the resulting benefits of better execution and easier maintainability. This was achieved by recognizing that a large number of the expert rules essentially implemented a simple table lookup, which were replaced with a C function. Some of the rule sets actually increased in number due to a more explicit representation of the evidence combinations. The suspiciousness evaluation module consists of 8,000 lines of Nexpert code, 1300 lines of SQL code, and 2000 lines of C.

Each rule set looks for various indications of financial activity characteristic of money laundering. Heuristic knowledge is also used to interpret the free-text occupation and business type fields from the forms. These heuristics were developed based on the actual values observed in this field. Other rules search for patterns of

Figure 7: User Directed Mode

activity associated with specific money laundering techniques such as "smurfing", which is making transactions for amounts just under the \$10,000 reporting threshold in an attempt to avoid a CTR filing. Each rule contributes positive or negative evidence that the transaction/subject/account is suspicious or legitimate, respectively. The evidence from each rule is combined in a simple Bayesian fashion to come up with a single suspiciousness rating for the transaction/subject/account. High suspiciousness scores are then reported to the analysts for further investigation.

Interactive Query Interface. FinCEN's computing environment consists primarily of IBM-compatible personal computers running DOS and Microsoft Windows. Because of the possibility that FAIS would need to be available to additional users, it was extremely desirable to have a user interface that could run on either a UNIX workstation or a PC. Neuron Data's Open Interface was selected as the development tool for the GUI to minimize the effort of porting the interface. The interactive query interface consists of about 25,000 lines of C code in addition to the Open Interface resource files and libraries.

The interactive query interface was designed in response to the needs of users to view disjoint but related sets of data simultaneously while searching for potential leads in the database. Screen forms are used to formulate queries into a database. Data retrieved from the database

are displayed as a list in an output window. The output list serves as a starting point for further investigation. The output window provides a pull down menu in which the user can request further information or perform further actions on a selected subset of the output list. A user may request a more detailed view of an item in the list; this information, often in list form, is displayed on a separate window. Additional windows are created by retrieval of increasingly detailed information (or by retrieval of additional related information) on the initial set of data. The multiple windowed environment facilitates the conceptualization of linkages between seemingly disjoint subject matter. The NetMap and Nexpert Object based link analysis and suspiciousness evaluation modules, which can be invoked via menu selections in the output screen, provide additional information that may aid the user in this conceptualization task. The ability to view data simultaneously in a compartmentalized manner enables the user's investigative process and was facilitated by Open Interface's object orientation.

Users enter the system by selecting data-driven or user-directed mode from a main menu. Data-driven mode brings up the window shown in figure 6. The user selects a score threshold above which to examine subjects. Person or organization subject types may be specified. Other thresholds, such as the number of filings or the number of transactions by a subject, may also be used to eliminate subjects from the list. Filters in the display, which use the flags in the database, allow users to ignore previously examined or known legitimate subjects. Alternatively, the user-directed mode, as depicted in figure 7, allows a user to construct a query based on information items from the transactions, including form type. The actual SQL query may be viewed as it is constructed incrementally. The query returns a set of transactions, organized by subject or account, which the user selects from the "view" menu.

In either mode the user examines the results of the query in several windows, moving among them as dictated by his interest and analysis results as depicted in figure 8. (In figure 8, all identifying information has been replaced with generic identifiers in order to protect the privacy of the actual subjects.) In this example, the data-driven query returns a list of subjects, from which the user chooses subject 5338, a business, which received a high suspiciousness score (i.e., 150) and has 129 CTR's totaling over \$36M in the year ended 1 December 1993. From the "associations" menu, the user then views all subjects associated with BUSINESS-5338 in another window, which includes the original, BUSINESS-5338, and 10 additional businesses and persons which appear on any transactions along with BUSINESS-5338. Next the user selects three of the subjects from this list, PERSON-

21976, PERSON-30185, and BUSINESS-30186, and requests a list of all their transactions. A user can continue this link tracing process indefinitely, via either subjects or accounts, until a trail is completed or exhausted. The user is responsible for keeping track of where he is in the set of linked windows, but this is made easier by the inclusion of a hierarchical display of all active windows.

Link Analysis. Alta Analytics' NetMap link analysis package (Davidson 1993) was selected and integrated with the custom FAIS system components because it provided a powerful visualization tool that exploits the human analyst's superior ability to recognize patterns and because it effectively accommodated much larger sets of nodes and connections in its "wagon-wheel" display than is possible with the more traditional law enforcement "link and edge" charts. FinCEN analysts use both types of representations. The wagon wheel display is useful during the analysis process when one is exploring sets of links; the link and edge display (referred to in the law enforcement community as the "Anacapa" chart) is useful for presentations of fully developed analyses. Figures 9 and 10 provide examples of these two types of displays. These figures are reproductions of portions of actual intelligence reports produced by FAIS, with all identifying data removed. They illustrate the users' ability to continue the linkage discovery and significance evaluation processes in greater detail as they focus on smaller data sets.

A user invokes NetMap with a selection of subjects or accounts. All transactions and associated information from those transactions are loaded into NetMap from the FAIS database. The interface to NetMap required 400 lines of C code. The user explores this information, selecting those items relevant to a particular case and possibly merging some subjects that the data-driven consolidation left separate.

Hardware and System Software Environment. FAIS hardware and system software currently consist of SUN servers and workstations running the Solaris 2.3 operating system. The live BSA data is stored in Sybase on a 6 processor SPARCcenter 2000 with 768 MB of memory and 88 GB of disk storage, with 70 GB available for data. Since the Sybase SQL server runs on this machine and is the bottleneck for large searches, as many other application modules as possible have been distributed to other workstations. One workstation is a development SQL server; a second is a file server for application code, and others are Nexpert Object/Smart Elements 2.0 and NetMap 3.63 servers. The user workstations are SPARCstations (2's & 5's) configured with 32-48 MB of memory and 400 MB - 1 GB of disk space. Release 1 of




Figure 9: Wagon Wheel Link Analysis Display

specific problem instance. This global invocation of knowledge is necessary because these parts of FAIS's task must evaluate all incoming data to prepare it for the rule-based suspiciousness evaluation. Finally, the search model embodied in the user-directed concept of operations is the result of the acquisition of procedural knowledge. Instead of embedding this procedural knowledge for use solely by the system in problem solving, this knowledge is used by the expert user to reason heuristically through his own searches. The users are intelligent agents in the context of a mixed human and computer problem solving system. The human and software agents cooperate via the database. As we gain insights into how the users perform their tasks, some of these functions will be automated.

The tasks which FAIS performs are significantly different from tasks traditionally thought amenable to the expert system approach (Hayes-Roth, Waterman, and Lenat 1983) in several ways. Most important, FAIS attempts to perform a task that was not performed at all prior to the existence of this system. There was no computing infrastructure to link transactions automatically. Even if this infrastructure had been available, the automated evaluation of suspiciousness — which is the "expert-system like" part of FAIS — could not have been performed manually, simply because of the large data volume involved. The primary goal of FAIS's development, therefore, was to enable the performance of this task and provide the associated operational benefits, rather than to increase productivity, save money, speed up decisions, improve decision quality, or retain or distribute scarce expertise.

Another difference is that there are no clearly provable experts for this process, although there are analysts experienced in working with BSA data who have a detailed understanding of indicators of suspiciousness. These analysts have differing perspectives on what factors make a set of transactions suspicious. These differing perspectives do not need to be resolved and made consistent in favor of some (possibly non-existent) ground-truth; rather, they need to be combined appropriately and evaluated systematically. A large part of the knowledge engineering in this domain consisted not of making explicit the problem solving behavior and knowledge of expert analysts, but rather of conducting experiments on the data itself to test the intuition of these analysts about the actual data.

FAIS attempts to provide assistance to analysts; the combination of computer and human can perform a task that neither could perform alone. FAIS does not process individual transactions against a database. Instead, it (re)evaluates the suspiciousness of each subject and account in the database as it receives new evidence (i.e., additional relevant transactions). Finally, FAIS does not perform extensive reasoning with a large set of concepts to perform one specific task; rather, it combines evidence from multiple perspectives at various points in a multi-step process.

Database as a Blackboard

Although the blackboard nature of the FAIS database is discussed above, it is important to note how its use differs from traditional blackboard systems, such as those described in (Engelmore & Morgan 1988). First, all input data is loaded into the database, and all "accepted"-level consolidations are performed. The resulting subject and account clusters, and their derived data, result from the application of knowledge across the entire blackboard without waiting for any other part of the system to request it. This is necessary because of performance considerations when a human user is in the loop. More important, the pre-population of the database with clusters allow the users to shift their focus freely from transactions to subjects or accounts, and back again, as their investigations warrant.

Unlike traditional uses of a blackboard to control a specific problem solution, the FAIS blackboard controls multiple problem solution instances interleaved over a long time period, during which additional relevant data may arrive randomly. The data volume and temporal aspects dominate the choice of implementation. Whereas traditional blackboard systems build, use, and then discard the data relevant to a particular problem instance, FAIS must provide continuity over time, serving as an institutional memory for multiple investigations, and




Figure 10: Link and Edge (Anacapa) Display

allow for the possibility of connecting separate investigations. Because FAIS integrates intelligent software and human agents in a cooperative discovery task on a very large data space, temporal and performance issues – which are addressed by database technology – dominate the system design.

At present, the rule-based suspicion evaluation module also runs across the entire blackboard, again, to provide rapid queries of scores to the users. In a sense, this makes the data-driven analysis search breadth-first, rather than depth-first. As we introduce more refined, and narrowly applicable rule sets, special purpose consolidation modules, and other forms of reasoning (e.g., case-based) that may have limited applicability, the blackboard will take on a more traditional flavor with a variety of representations, describing portions of the database to varying degrees.

Case Based Reasoning and Machine Learning

Case based reasoning (CBR) and other machine learning techniques were explored during the development of this system.⁵ These efforts were complementary to the main system development effort and were pursued with the

⁵This work was performed by Cognitive Systems, Inc. and Ascent Technology, Inc., respectively.

intent of being added to the overall system if they were successful. While they are not currently included in the operational system, we do anticipate using them in future versions after the issues identified during these efforts are resolved. These efforts are discussed here because they provide insights into the utility of these AI techniques for a specific application.

Several problems arose in our attempt to utilize a commercial CBR shell. CBR required that we define an appropriate set of characteristics to represent cases. While knowledge engineering identified a candidate set, these characteristics are not explicitly represented in the FAIS database. The computational power to derive these features in data-driven mode from all transactions is not yet available to us. Even deriving these features for some transactions for evaluation purposes was difficult because the features are not clearly specified in terms of the data; some require additional domain knowledge. CBR shells are based on a flat feature vector; they were unable to describe the more complex data structures that are required to represent money laundering schemes. The basic ideas of CBR (i.e., nearest-neighbor matching and inductive retrieval) appeared useful for parts of the task, but could not be "stripped out" of a commercial CBR shell, and the overhead involved of incorporating the commercial CBR shell was significant. At the time this

effort was performed, FAIS was not yet operational, so a reasonably sized set of clearly labeled positive examples of suspicious activity in the BSA database was not available. Finally, CBR shells do not scale to the size required for this task.

A more direct approach to applying the machine learning ideas of nearest neighbor retrieval and inductive building of decision trees was also explored. The lack of labeled examples was the major obstacle to using these techniques. Unsupervised learning algorithms were considered, but the difficulties of deriving appropriate features on which they would operate made these techniques infeasible. These difficulties were exacerbated by the poor data quality and the need for additional background knowledge. It was discovered that these techniques are potentially useful as knowledge engineering aids, to conduct experiments with the data. In one test, we used induction to create a decision tree with a limited data set based on 40 features identified during knowledge engineering. Analysts then examined the decision trees to determine how useful the various heuristic features were as indicators of suspiciousness.

Application Use and Payoff

FAIS has been used operationally since March 1993. As of January 1995, 20 million transactions had been entered and linked together, resulting in 3.0 million consolidated subjects and 2.5 million accounts. This includes all transactions that have been received from January 1993 through December 1994 as well as selected transactions that occurred during 1992. On average, approximately 200,000 transactions are added per week. A dedicated group of intelligence analysts is engaged full time in reviewing, validating, and pursuing potential leads generated by the system. They also provide leads to other FinCEN analysts for follow-up investigations. These analysts have as their primary responsibility the process of BSA suspiciousness analysis. An additional responsibility is to serve as the primary sources of knowledge for system development. There are currently three full-time analysts, but there have been as many as five. These users have been augmented, at times, by other FinCEN analysts who used the opportunity to learn about the FAIS system and to work on specific projects involving BSA data.

The analysts use both the data-driven and user-directed modes of FAIS. The data-driven mode is used to select those subjects or accounts that display a relatively high suspiciousness score. The analysts then further evaluate the subjects or accounts through research and analysis of the financial data and other source data for development into a valid lead. FAIS reviews, processes and evaluates each BSA filing for the analysts to such a degree that the intense effort and time expended in the pre-FAIS

environment is no longer needed. The lead is then fully researched and analyzed for dissemination to the appropriate law enforcement agency. These agencies provide FinCEN with feedback regarding the use of the information generated by the system. In one early evaluation, about half the subjects identified by the system were already known to the field agency conducting the investigation, and the unknown subjects exhibited similar behavior. This was a very favorable evaluation of the system, showing both credibility and utility; if it had identified only unknown subjects, it would have lacked credibility, yet if had identified only existing subjects, it would have lacked utility.

In the user-directed mode the analysts set specific criteria in support of a request by a law enforcement agency, a request from other groups within FinCEN, or a self-initiated project. A project will contain numerous "hits" that fit the specified criteria, but the hits may not necessarily be related to one another. Each subject on the "hit" list will contain a suspiciousness score that directs the analysts immediately to the subjects with the higher degree of suspect financial activity. User-directed analyses did take place in the pre-FAIS environment; the time for a typical proactive query has been reduced from about one day to less than one hour. As in the data-driven mode, the subjects are further evaluated through research and analysis.

As the analysts have gained experience with the system, it has become more productive. Table 1 summarizes reports by year (through April 1995) in terms of number of reports produced and number of subjects identified. These reports correspond to over \$1 billion in potential laundered funds.

Year	Reports	Subjects
1993	27	276
1994	75	403
1995 (partial)	>300	>1000

Table 1: Leads Resulting from FAIS

Feedback and liaison with customers play an important role. The information that we are gathering is very useful for knowledge base evaluation. Opened investigations resulting from leads previously unknown to law enforcement suggest the value of looking for other subjects that display the same type of behavior. Since March 1993, FinCEN has received 109 feedback forms from outside agencies in addition to feedback from in-house investigations. Over 90% of the feedback indicates either new cases opened or relevance to ongoing investigations. A recent feedback form notified us of the first closed case resulting from a lead generated by the system and follow-up investigation, prosecution, and

conviction. The appropriate follow-up to those cases for which we have not received feedback will be conducted in the future to obtain a more accurate picture of the value of the leads disseminated.

Another benefit of FAIS is that it has allowed analysts to see the BSA data as it has not been seen before. Queries against the FAIS database have yielded insights useful for BSA policy decisions, form redesigns, and identification of required compliance actions. The analysts have been able to determine which data elements are highly useful in investigative support functions versus the data that are not. In turn, identification of businesses that are linked to the legitimate transactions is extremely useful to the Department of Treasury in support of the BSA Compliance Program. It is considered highly probable that these businesses should be on a financial institution's exemption list.

Application Development and Deployment

The development team consisted of seven technical staff, most of who had additional responsibilities. Development costs consisted of their salaries and the acquisition of the hardware and software tools. Because FinCEN was a new agency, we had to acquire resources and hire staff at the same time we were developing the system. The entire team was not in place until late spring of 1992. Computers for the programming staff, off-the-shelf software components, training in Sybase, Nexpert Object, and Open Interface, and a server large enough to hold a meaningful data set were also not in place until about June 1992.

In the mid-1980's, the U.S. Customs Service developed a system to address the task currently performed by FAIS. This system, CAIS, was inherited by FinCEN as part of FinCEN's formation in 1990. CAIS was designed for the volume of transactions typical of the mid-1980's. It ran on Apollo workstations under the Aegis operating system, and incorporated commercial off-the-shelf software that was no longer supported or available on current hardware and operating systems in 1990. It was decided that the only way to update CAIS to handle the vastly increased transaction volume was to rebuild it in a new hardware and software environment.

Table 2 lists key FAIS development milestones.

Jan 1991	Initial Design and Planning; BSA Data Transfer and Data Model Design in Progress
May 1991	Data Model Finalized
June 1991	User Interface Development Started; Data Sweeps of BSA Data in progress
Oct 1991	Data Load Program Completed
Dec 1991	Initial Workstations Configured

March 1992	Design Review – Overall System Architecture Approved
June 1992	Sun 490 Server Configured; Interface Development Started
Sept 1992	Netmap and User Interface Integrated; Data Updates Being loaded
March 1993	Release 1.0 Operational
Jan 1994	Release 1.1 Operational
Dec 1994	Release 2.0 Operational

Table 2: Development Milestones

Initial planning for FAIS began in early 1991. This planning included the collection and analysis of requirements, the development of the conceptual system architecture and the data model, and the evaluation and selection of hardware and off-the-shelf software tools for system development. Procedures and programs for providing the data from the U.S. Customs Data Center to FinCEN were developed during 1991, and an extraction from the Financial Database in TECS of the entire historical BSA database was performed so it would be available for system development and operations. The CAIS system was re-evaluated and improvements were suggested. A major design review took place in March 1992 at which point the requirements for Release 1.0 and the overall system architecture and the data model design were approved. Development of FAIS began in earnest in June 1992. An early release of the user interface with a limited data set was delivered in September 1992. This delivery also included the suspiciousness evaluation module and the NetMap link analysis module. Release 1.0 was deployed to users in March 1993. Release 1.1 was deployed in January 1994. Continued system development has resulted in Release 2.0, containing a better user interface, additional aggregates identified during system usage and evaluation, and increased performance and storage resulting from a port to larger, faster computers, and version updates to the system software packages.

Because of the close ties between developers and users, deployment of the system occurred incrementally. During development, users were able to look at "work in progress" and make suggestions for improvements. As soon as a component was ready and tested, it was integrated and made available to the users. Because developers are readily available to fix problems, we are able to provide new capabilities and fixes almost immediately, allowing us to try out promising ideas before they are completely verified. User hardware is essentially identical to developer hardware; we share the same network and system administrators. System operation, i.e., the data-driven tape copying, data loading, extension building, and suspiciousness evaluation, is also performed

by the development staff. These close ties also allowed us to forgo "productization" of the system until release 1.1. The availability of developers to operate and fix the unproductized release 1.0 system meant that release 1.0 could be developed and deployed faster. The current version 2.0 of FAIS has been in use since December 1994.

Maintenance

Initial management direction was to provide an operational capability as soon as practical. To meet this goal, it was decided to re-implement the suspiciousness evaluation rule bases that had been part of CAIS and concentrate development resources on the overall system. Most of the development effort was focused at building the tools for handling the large FAIS database. Knowledge engineering concentrated, in the early phases, on acquisition of procedural knowledge necessary for the user-directed mode, for the linking together of related transactions, and for the interpretation of data uncertainties.

As the system evolved, the early emphasis on deployment of operational capability shifted to performance improvement. Knowledge engineering focused on identifying additional indicators of suspiciousness and evaluating the effectiveness of differing methods of combining these indicators. To this end, a number of special purpose data "screening" queries were run and their results evaluated as if they had come through the data-driven side of the system. The intent is to develop each successful "screen" into a small rule-based knowledge source that can contribute to the overall system by posting "suspiciousness" indicators onto the database/blackboard. We have designed the underlying database to allow easy extensibility of the derived attributes (e.g., aggregates) upon which these rules operate. We have found it is important to develop such knowledge sources in the context of the entire database. Early efforts to look at manageable subsets of the data invariably led to skewed results and were not applicable to the overall task of nationwide screening.

The system is still under development, and maintenance is performed by the developers. Because the underlying domain will continue to change – in response to law enforcement successes and to changes in the financial system itself – the knowledge bases will never be "finished"; they will have to evolve continually to keep pace with changes in money laundering techniques and with changes in the BSA forms. Some maintenance is shifting to the analysts as they acquire training in tools such as Nexpert and SQL. The knowledge bases contain some of FinCEN's most sensitive knowledge regarding money laundering and our intelligence sources and methods. Also, money laundering and BSA data is a

complex domain that requires a significant time to learn. Maintaining the knowledge bases with dedicated in-house staff provides the required security and continuity necessary for these tasks.

Because specialized expertise regarding money laundering is distributed among all FinCEN analysts, we are developing procedures for incorporating this wide range of knowledge into the system. The design of the suspiciousness evaluation modules, with individual rule sets addressing specific money laundering indicators, will facilitate the incorporation of additional indicators. These mechanisms could be as simple as using the user-directed mode to search for subjects meeting criteria that indicate a newly identified money laundering technique. If a particular technique appears to be widespread, additional rule sets are developed and incorporated into the suspiciousness evaluation module to routinely evaluate all filings for these techniques.

A key aspect of maintenance of FAIS involves the tracking and evaluation of the disposition of potential leads generated by the system. Because of the time required for investigations and prosecutions, we are not yet able to collect comprehensive data. It is intended that feedback from FinCEN's customer agencies be used to guide the continued evolution of the knowledge bases.

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The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of all their colleagues at FinCEN who aided in the development of FAIS or contributed to its knowledge bases. We would also like to thank the staff of the U.S. Customs Data Center at Newington, VA, who consistently and generously provide us with the data that drives the system. Most important, we would like to thank the retired founding Director of FinCEN, Mr. Brian Bruh, who had the vision to actively champion the use of advanced computing technology to aid in the detection and analysis of financial crimes, for his unwavering support, confidence, assistance, and insights, and without whom this system never would have been developed, and the current Director of FinCEN, Mr. Stanley E. Morris, who immediately recognized the value of FAIS not only for generating leads but also for augmenting regulatory and compliance programs, and whose continued support has been essential to its expanded use and development.

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