# Context Specific Multiagent Coordination and Planning with Factored MDPs

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#### Abstract

We present a new, principled and efficient algorithm for decision making and planning cooperative multi-agent dynamic systems. We consider systems where the agents' value function is a sum of local value rules, that specify an increment to the value in certain contexts, which can depend both on the current state and on the actions of some subset of the agents. We show that the task of finding an optimal joint action relative to this type of value function leads to a very natural communication pattern, where agents send messages along a coordination graph determined by the structure of the value rules. We show that the coordination structure depends on the state of the system, and even on the actual numerical values assigned to the value rules. We then show how to apply this framework to the task of multi-agent planning in dynamic systems. We view the entire multi-agent system as a single, large Markov decision process (MDP). We assume that the agents' reward functions and the system dynamics are described in terms of factored rules. We show how to use an efficient linear programming algorithm to derive a rule-based value function which is an approximation to the optimal joint value function. Given this value function, the agents then apply the coordination graph algorithm at each iteration of the process to decide on a joint action, potentially leading to a different coordination pattern at each step of the plan.

#### 1 Introduction

Consider a system where multiple agents, each with its own set of possible actions and its own observations, must coordinate in order to achieve a common goal. We want to find a mechanism for coordinating the agents' actions so as to maximize their joint utility. A naive approach is to simply consider all possible joint actions, and choose the one that gives the highest value. Unfortunately, this approach is infeasible in all but the simplest settings, as the number of joint actions grows exponentially with the number of agents. Furthermore, we want to avoid a centralized decision making process, letting the agents communicate with each other so as to reach a jointly optimal decision. In this paper, we provide a framework for context-specific coordination in multi-agent systems. We provide a simple communication algorithm between the agents based on an elegant and intuitive data structure which we call the *coordination graph*. We also show how this framework can be applied to sequential decision making using the framework of factored MDPs.

Our approach is based on *context specificity* — a common property of real-world decision making tasks [2]. Specifically, we assume that the agents' value function can be decomposed into a set of *value rules*, each describing a context

— an assignment to state variables and actions — and a value increment which gets added to the agents' total value in situations when that context applies. For example, a value rule might assert that in states where agent 1 and agent 2 are facing each other in a narrow hallway, and if they both take the action of moving forward, then the total value is decremented by 1000 points. This representation is reminiscent of the tree-structured value functions of Boutilier and Dearden [3], but is substantially more general, as the rules are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but can be added together to form more complex functions.

Based on this representation, we define a notion of a coordination graph, which describes the dependencies implied by the value rules between the agents' actions. We provide a distributed decision-making algorithm that uses message passing over the communication graph to reach a jointly optimal action. This algorithm allows the coordination structure between the agents to vary from one situation to another. For example, it can change in different states; e.g., if the two agents are not near each other, they do not have to coordinate their motion. The coordination structure can also vary based on the exact choice of the values in the value rules; e.g., if the rewards are such that it is simply not optimal for one agent to enter the hallway, then no coordination will ever be required regardless of agent 2's action.

We then extend this framework to the problem of sequential decision making under uncertainty. We use the framework of Markov decision processes (MDPs), viewing the "action" as a joint action for all of the agents and the reward is the total reward for all of the agents. Once again, we use context specificity, assuming that the rewards and the probabilities defining the transition dynamics are all rule-structured. We show how to use an efficient linear programming algorithm to construct an approximate value function for this MDP, one that exhibits a similar rule structure. The agents can then use the coordination graph to decide on a joint action at each time step. Interestingly, although the value function is computed once in an offline setting, the online choice of action using the coordination graph gives rise to a highly variable coordination structure.

# 2 Context specific coordination task

We begin by considering the simpler problem of having a group of agents select a globally optimal joint action in order to maximize their joint value. Suppose we have a collection of agents, where each agent j must choose an action  $a_j$  from a finite set of possible actions  $Dom(A_j)$ . We use A to denote

 $\{A_1,\ldots,A_g\}$ . The agents are acting in a space described by a set of discrete state variables,  $\mathbf{X}=\{X_1\ldots X_n\}$ , where each  $X_j$  takes on values in some finite domain  $\mathrm{Dom}(X_j)$ . A state  $\mathbf{x}$  defines a setting  $x_j\in\mathrm{Dom}(X_j)$  for each variable  $X_j$  and an action  $\mathbf{a}$  defines an action  $a_j\in\mathrm{Dom}(A_j)$  for each agent. The agents must choose the joint action  $\mathbf{a}$  that maximizes the total utility.

In a multi-agent coordination problem, the overall value function is often decomposed as a sum of "local" value function, associated with the "jurisdiction" of the different agents. For example, if multiple agents are collaborating in a task to clear the debris from some large area, our overall value is the total amount of debris cleared and the total resources spent. But, we can often decompose this into a set of local value functions, where the value function for each agent represents the amount of debris cleared from its area of responsibility, and the amount of resources it spent.

A standard solution is to simply specify a table for each agent, listing its local values for different combinations of variables on which the value depends. However, this representation is often highly redundant, forcing us to represent many irrelevant interactions. In our example, an agent  $A_1$ 's value function might depend on the actions of a neighboring agent  $A_2$ , e.g., if  $A_2$ 's action is moving debris into  $A_1$ 's territory. However, this is only one situation, and there is no point in making  $A_1$ 's entire value function depend on  $A_2$ 's action in all other situations. As another example, the agent's value function might depend on whether it is currently raining, but only if there is a hole in the roof in his area; there is no point depending on this attribute in all other situations.

To exploit such context specific independencies, we define value rules:

**Definition 2.1** A value rule  $\langle \rho, \mathbf{c} : v \rangle$  is a function  $\rho$ :  $\{\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{A}\} \mapsto R$ , where the context  $\mathbf{c}$  is an assignment to a subset of the variables  $\mathbf{C} \subseteq \{\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{A}\}$  and  $v \in R$ , such that:

$$\rho(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) = \begin{cases} v, & \text{if } \{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}\} \text{ is consistent with } \mathbf{c}; \\ 0, & \text{otherwise}; \end{cases}$$

where an assignment c to some set of variables C is consistent with some other assignment b to a subset of variables B if c and b assign the same value to every variable in C\OB. \blacksquare

In our hallway example from the introduction, we might have a rule

 $\langle \rho_h, A_1, A_2 \text{ in-hallway} = true \wedge$ 

 $A_1 = straight \land A_2 = straight : -1000\rangle$ . This definition of rules adapts the definition of rules for exploiting context specific independence in inference for Bayesian networks by Zhang and Poole [13].

Note that the value of the rule  $\rho(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a})$  can be defined by observing only the context variables in the assignment  $\{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}\}$ . We call such function a restricted domain function:

**Definition 2.2** We say that a function f is restricted to a domain  $Dom[f] = C \subseteq X$  if  $f : C \mapsto IR$ . If f is restricted to Y and  $Y \subset Z$ , we will use f(z) as shorthand for f(y) where y is the part of the instantiation z that corresponds to variables in Y.

Under this definition, a value rule  $\langle \rho, \mathbf{c} : v \rangle$  has domain restricted to C, e.g.,  $\mathrm{Dom}[\rho_h] = \{ \mathrm{agent} \ 1 \ \mathrm{in-hallway}, \mathrm{agent} \ 2 \ \mathrm{in-hallway}, A_1, A_2 \}.$ 

The immediate local utility  $Q_j$  of agent j can be represented by a set of value rules, we call such function a *rule-based function* or rule function for short:

**Definition 2.3** A rule-based function f is a function f:  $\{X, A\} \mapsto IR$ , composed of a set of rules  $\{\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n\}$  such that:

$$f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \rho_i(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}). \quad \blacksquare$$

Thus, each  $Q_j$  is defined by a set of rules  $\{\rho_1^j, \ldots, \rho_{n_i}^j\}$ .

The notion of a rule-based function is related to the tree-structure functions used by Boutilier and Dearden [3] and by Boutilier et al. [2], but is substantially more general. In the tree-structure value functions, the rules corresponding to the different leaves are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Thus, the total number of different values represented in the tree is equal to the number of leaves (or rules). In the rule-based function representation, the rules are not mutually exclusive, and their values are added to form the overall function value for different settings of the variables. Different rules are added in different settings, and, in fact, with k rules, one can easily generate  $2^k$  different possible values. Thus, the rule-based functions can provide a compact representation to a much richer class of value functions.

Note that if each rule  $\rho_i^j$  has domain restricted to  $C_i^j$ , then  $Q_j$  will be a restricted domain function of  $\bigcup_i C_i^j$ . The domain of  $Q_j$  can be further divided into two parts: the observable state variables:

$$Observable[Q_j] = \{X_i \in \mathbf{X} \mid X_i \in Dom[Q_j]\};$$

and the relevant agent decision variables:

$$Relevant[Q_j] = \{A_i \in A \mid A_i \in Dom[Q_j]\}.$$

This distinction will allow us to characterize the observations each agent needs to make and the type of communication needed to obtain the joint optimal action, i.e., the joint action choice that maximizes the total utility  $Q = \sum_j Q_j$ .

### 3 Cooperative action selection

Recall that the agents' task is to select a joint action a that maximizes  $\sum_j Q_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a})$ . The fact that the  $Q_j$  depend on the actions of multiple agents forces the agents to coordinate their action choices. As we now show, this coordination can be performed using a very natural data structure called a *coordination graph*.

#### 3.1 Coordination graph

Intuitively, a coordination graph connects agents whose local value functions interact with each other. This definition is the directed extension of the definition we proposed in previous work [8] and is the collaborative counterpart of the relevance graph proposed for competitive settings by Koller and Milch [11].

**Definition 3.1** A coordination graph for a set of agents with local utilities  $Q = \{Q_1, \ldots, Q_g\}$  is a directed graph whose nodes corresponds to agent decisions  $\{A_1, \ldots, A_g\}$ , and which contains an edge  $A_j \rightarrow A_i$  if and only if  $A_i \in Relevant[Q_j]$ .

An example of a coordination graph with 6 agents and one state variable is shown in Fig. 1(a). We see, for example, that agent  $A_3$  has the parents  $A_1$  and  $A_2$ , because both their value functions depend on  $A_3$ 's action; conversely,  $A_3$  has the child  $A_4$ , because  $A_4$ 's action affects  $Q_3$ .




Figure 1: (a) Coordination graph for a 6-agent problem, the rules in  $Q_j$  are indicated in the figure by the rules next to  $A_j$ . (b) Graph after conditioning on the state X = x.

Recall that our task is to task to find a coordination strategy for the agents to maximize  $\sum_j Q_j$  at state  $\mathbf{x}$ . First, note that the domain of the  $Q_j$  functions that comprise the value can include both action choices and state variables. We assume that the agents have full observability of the relevant state variables, i.e., agent j can observe Observable  $[Q_j]$ . Given a particular state  $\mathbf{x} = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ , agent j discards all rules in  $Q_j$  not consistent with the current state  $\mathbf{x}$ . We call this process conditioning on the current state.

Note that the agents do not need to have access to all of the state variables: An agent j only needs to observe the variables that appear in its  $Q_j$  function, i.e.,  $Observable[Q_j]$ , thereby decreasing considerably the amount of information each agent needs to observe. Interestingly, after the agents observe the current state the coordination graph may become simpler, in our example the edges  $A_1 \rightarrow A_3$  and  $A_6 \rightarrow A_1$  disappear after agents observe that X = x, as shown in Fig. 1(b). Thus, agents  $A_1$  and  $A_6$  will only need to coordinate directly in the context of  $X = \bar{x}$ .

After conditioning on the current state, each  $Q_j$  will only depend on the agents' action choices A. Our task now is to select a joint action a that maximizes  $\sum_j Q_j(\mathbf{a})$ . The structure of the coordination graph will allow us to design an efficient coordination strategy for the agents. Maximization in a graph structure suggests the use of non-serial dynamic programming [1], or variable elimination. To exploit structure in rules, we use a variable elimination algorithm similar to variable elimination in a Bayesian network with context specific independence [13].

Intuitively, the algorithm operates by having an individual agent "collect" value rules relevant to them from their parents. The agent can then decide on its own strategy, taking all of the implications into consideration. The choice of optimal action and the ensuing payoff will, of course, depend on the actions of agents whose strategies have not yet been decided. For example,  $A_1$  optimal "strategy" might be to go left if  $A_2$  goes left, with an incremental value of 3, and to go right if  $A_2$  goes right, with an incremental value of -1. However,  $A_1$  cannot make a final decision on what to do without knowing  $A_2$ 's final decision, which might depend on various other factors as well. The agent therefore simply communicates the value ramifications of its strategy to other agents, so that they can make informed decisions on their own strategies.

We now describe the algorithm more formally. In the description of our algorithm, we will need to perform a maximization step, i.e., "maximizing out" some variable. We will use  $MaxOut(f, A_i)$  to denote a procedure that takes a rule

function f and a variable  $A_i$  and returns a rule function g such that:  $g(A) = \max_{a_i} f(A)$ . We will describe the implementation of such procedure in Section 3.2.

Our rule-base coordination algorithm computes the maximum utility by repeating the following loop, until all agents have decided on a strategy.

- 1. Select some undecided agent  $A_l$ ;
- 2. Agent  $A_l$  receives a message from its parents in the graph with all the rules that depend on  $A_l$ , i.e., all rules  $\langle \rho, \mathbf{c} : v \rangle$  such that  $A_l \in \mathbf{C}$ . These rules are added to  $Q_l$ . At this point the graph structure will change, in particular  $A_l$  has no parents in the coordination graph and can be optimized independently.
- 3. Agent  $A_l$  computes its local maximization, i.e., computes  $g_l = MaxOut(Q_l, A_l)$ . This local maximization corresponds to a strategy decision.
- 4. Agent  $A_l$  distributes the rules in  $g_l$  to its children. At this point the graph structure changes:  $A_l$ 's strategy is now fixed, and therefore it has been "eliminated".

Once this procedure is completed, a second pass in the reverse order can be performed to compute the optimal action choice for all of the agents. We note that this algorithm is essentially a context specific extension of the algorithm used to solve influence diagrams with multiple parallel decisions [9] (as is the one in the next section). However, to our knowledge, these ideas have not been applied to the problem of coordinating the decision making process of multiple collaborating agents.

The cost of this algorithm is polynomial in the number of new rules generated in the maximization operation  $MaxOut(Q_l, A_l)$ . The number of rules is never larger and in many cases exponentially smaller than the complexity bounds on the table-based coordination graph in our previous work [8], which, in turn, was exponential only in the *induced width* of the graph [6]. However, the computational costs involved in managing sets of rules usually imply that the computational advantage of the rule-based approach will only be prominent in problems that possess a fair amount of context specific structure.

More importantly, the rule based coordination structure exhibits several important properties. First, as we discussed, the structure often changes when conditioning on the current state, as in Fig. 1. Thus, in different states of the world, the agents may have to coordinate their actions differently. In our example, if the situation is such that a certain passageway is blocked, agent  $A_1$  might have to transport his debris through the territory of agent  $A_2$ , requiring coordination between them.

More surprisingly, interactions that seem to hold between agents even after the state-based simplification can disappear as agents make strategy decisions. For example, if  $Q_1 = \{\langle a_1 \wedge a_2 : 5 \rangle, \langle \overline{a_1} \wedge a_2 \wedge \overline{a_3} : 1 \rangle\}$ , then  $A_1$ 's optimal strategy is to do  $a_1$  regardless, at which point the added value is 5 regardless of  $A_3$ 's decision. In other words,  $MaxOut(Q_1, A_1) = \{\langle a_2 : 5 \rangle\}$ . In this example, there is an a priori dependence between  $A_2$  and  $A_3$ . However, after maximizing  $A_1$ , the dependence disappears and agents  $A_2$  and  $A_3$  may not need to communicate.

The context-sensitivity of the rules also reduces communication between agents. In particular, agents only need to communicate relevant rules to each other, reducing unnecessary interaction. For example, in Fig. 1(b), when agent  $A_1$ 

decides on its strategy, agent  $A_5$  only needs to pass the rules that involve  $A_1$ , i.e., only  $\langle a_1 \wedge \overline{a_5} : 4 \rangle$ . The rule involving  $A_6$  is not transmitted, avoiding the need for agent  $A_1$  to consider agent  $A_6$ 's decision in its strategy.

Finally, we note that the rule structure provides substantial flexibility in constructing the system. In particular, the structure of the coordination graph can easily be adapted incrementally as new value rules are added or eliminated. For example, if it turns out that the floor in some room is too weak to bear the weight of two agents, it is easy to introduce an additional value rule that associates a negative value with pairs of action choices that lead to two agents going into the room at the same time.

### 3.2 Rule-based maximization

In our coordination algorithm, we need a maximization operator: the  $MaxOut(f, A_i)$  procedure which takes a rule function f and a variable  $A_i$  and returns a rule function g such that:  $g(\mathbf{a}) = \max_{a_i} f(\mathbf{a})$ . We will assume that every rule in f contains variable  $A_i$ . Our procedure is based on the rule-based variable elimination developed by Zhang and Poole [13] for Bayesian network inference. We briefly describe our construction here, as it is slightly different from theirs.

First, we are going to need to define two basic operations: rule splitting and residual. A rule  $\langle \rho, \mathbf{c} : v \rangle$  can be split on an uneliminated variable B with domain  $\{b_1, \ldots, b_k\}$  and replaced by an equivalent set of rules  $\{\langle \rho_1, \mathbf{c} \wedge b_1 : v \rangle, \ldots, \langle \rho_k, \mathbf{c} \wedge b_k : v \rangle\}$ . We have just split a rule on a variable, but we can also split a rule on a context b: Given a rule  $\langle \rho, \mathbf{c} : v \rangle$  and a context b compatible with  $\mathbf{c}$ , denote  $Split(\rho, \mathbf{b})$  by the successive splitting of  $\rho$  on each variable assigned in  $\mathbf{b}$  which is not assigned in  $\mathbf{c}$ .

When we split  $\rho$  on b we are left with a single rule compatible with b; all other rules have contexts incompatible with b. This set of incompatible rules is called the residual, denoted by  $Residual(\rho, \mathbf{b})$ . More formally, we have that  $Residual(\rho, \mathbf{b}) = \{\}$ , if  $\mathbf{b} \subseteq \mathbf{c}$ ; otherwise, select a variable B assigned as  $b_j$  in  $\mathbf{b}$ , but not assigned in  $\mathbf{c}$  and set  $Residual(\rho, \mathbf{b}) = \{\langle \mathbf{c} \land B = b_i : v \rangle \mid i \neq j\} \cup Residual(\langle \mathbf{c} \land B = b_j : v \rangle, \mathbf{b})$ .

Note that we can now separate the rule that is compatible with the splitting context b, that is,  $Split(\rho, \mathbf{b}) = Residual(\rho, \mathbf{b}) \cup \langle \mathbf{c} \wedge \mathbf{b} : v \rangle$ . None of the other rules will be compatible with b. Thus, if we want to add two compatible rules  $\langle \rho_1, \mathbf{c}_1 : v_1 \rangle$  and  $\langle \rho_2, \mathbf{c}_2 : v_2 \rangle$ , then all we need to do is replace these rules by the set:  $Residual(\rho_1, \mathbf{c}_2) \cup Residual(\rho_2, \mathbf{c}_1) \cup \langle \mathbf{c}_1 \wedge \mathbf{c}_2 : v_1 + v_2 \rangle$ .

We are now ready to describe the procedure. Note that we need to add a set of value rules with zero value to guarantee that our rule function f is complete, i.e., assigns a value to every context. The procedure in Fig. 2 maximizes out variable B from rule function f.

# 4 One-Step Lookahead

We now consider an extension to the action selection problem: we assume that the agents are trying to maximize the sum of an immediate reward and a value that they expect to receive one step in the future. We describe the dynamics of such system  $\tau$  using a dynamic decision network (DDN) [5].

```
MaxOut(f, B)
      g = \{\}.
      Add completing rules to f:
         \langle \rho_i, B = b_i : 0 \rangle, i = 1, \ldots, k.
      // Summing compatible rules:
      While there are two compatible rules \langle \rho_1, \mathbf{c}_1 : v_1 \rangle
         and \langle \rho_2, \mathbf{c}_2 : v_2 \rangle:
                   replace these two rules by the set:
                   Residual (\rho_1, \mathbf{c}_2) \cup Residual (\rho_2, \mathbf{c}_1) \cup
                   \langle \mathbf{c}_1 \wedge \mathbf{c}_2 : v_1 + v_2 \rangle.
     // Maximizing out variable B: Repeat until f is empty:
               If there are rules
                   \langle B = b_i \wedge \mathbf{c} : v_i \rangle, \forall b_i \in \text{Dom}(B), \text{ then}
                   remove these rules from f and add rule
                   \langle \mathbf{c} : \mathbf{max}_i \, v_i \rangle \text{ to } g;
               Else select two rules: \langle \rho_i, B = b_i \wedge c_i : v_i \rangle
                   and \langle \rho_j, B = b_j \wedge c_j : v_j \rangle such that c_i is
                  compatible with c<sub>j</sub>, but not identical, and
                   replace them with
                   Split(\rho_i, \mathbf{c}_j) \cup Split(\rho_j, \mathbf{c}_i)
```

Figure 2: Maximizing out variable B from rule function f.




Figure 3: A DDN for a 4-agent MDP.

# 4.1 Dynamic Decision Network

Let  $X_i$  denote the *i*th variable at the current time and  $X_i'$  the variable at the next step. The transition graph of a DDN is a two-layer directed acyclic graph G whose nodes are  $\{A_1, \ldots, A_g, X_1, \ldots, X_n, X_1', \ldots, X_n'\}$ , and where only nodes in X' have parents. We denote the parents of  $X_i'$  in the graph by  $Parents(X_i')$ . For simplicity of exposition, we assume that  $Parents(X_i') \subseteq X \cup A$ , i.e., all of the parents of a node are in the previous time step. (This assumption can be relaxed, but our algorithm becomes somewhat more complex.) Each node  $X_i'$  is associated with a conditional probability distribution (CPD)  $P(X_i' \mid Parents(X_i'))$ . The transition probability  $P(x' \mid x, a)$  is then defined to be  $\prod_i P(x_i' \mid u_i)$ , where  $u_i$  is the value in x, a of the variables in  $Parents(X_i')$ . The immediate rewards are a set of functions  $r_1, \ldots, r_g$ , and the next-step values are a set of functions  $h_1, \ldots, h_g$ .

Fig. 3 shows a DDN for a simple four-agent problem, where the ovals represent the variables  $X_i$  and the rectangles the agent actions. The diamond nodes in the first time step represent the immediate reward, while the h nodes in the second time step represent the future value associated with a subset of the state variables. The actions of agents  $A_1, \ldots, A_4$  are represented as squares.

In most representations of Bayesian networks and DDNs, tables are used to represent the utility nodes  $r_i$  and  $h_i$  and the transition probabilities  $P(X_i' \mid Parents(X_i'))$ . However, as discussed by Boutilier *et al.* [2], decision problems often

exhibit a substantial amount of context specificity, both in the value functions and in the transition dynamics. We have already described a rule-based representation of the value function components, which exploits context specificity. We now describe how the rule representation can also be used for the probabilities specifying the transition dynamics; our formulation follows the lines of [13].

**Definition 4.1** A probability rule  $(\pi, \mathbf{c} : p)$  is a function  $\pi$ :  $\{X, X', A\} \mapsto [0, 1]$ , where the context c is an assignment to a subset of the variables  $C \subseteq \{X, X', A\}$  and  $p \in [0, 1]$ ,

 $\pi(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}', \mathbf{a}) = \begin{cases} p, & \text{if } \{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}', \mathbf{a}\} \text{ is consistent with } \mathbf{c}; \\ 1, & \text{otherwise}; \end{cases}$ 

if  $\{x, x', a\}$  is consistent with c we say that the rule  $\pi$  is applicable to  $\{x, x', a\}$ . A rule-based conditional probability distribution (rule CPD) P is a function  $P: \{X'_i, X, A\} \mapsto$ [0, 1], composed of a set of probability rules  $\{\pi_1, \pi_2, \dots\}$ ,

$$P(\mathbf{x}_i' \mid \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) = \prod_{i=1}^n \pi_i(\mathbf{x}_i', \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a});$$

where for every assignment of  $(\mathbf{x}'_i, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a})$  one and only one rule should be applicable.

We can now define the conditional probabilities  $P(X'_i)$  $Parents(X'_i)$ ) as a rule CPD, where the context variables C of the rules depend on variables in  $\{X'_i \cup Parents(X'_i)\}$ . Using this compact DDN representation, we will be able to compute a one-step lookahead plan very efficiently.

## One-step lookahead action selection

In the one-step lookahead case, for any setting x of the state variables, the agents aim to maximize:

$$Q(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) = \sum_{j=1}^{g} r_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) + \sum_{\mathbf{x}'} P(\mathbf{x}' \mid \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) \sum_{j=1}^{g} h_j(\mathbf{x}').$$
We can decompose this global utility, or  $Q$  function, into local

 $Q_i$  functions:

$$Q_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) = r_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) + \sum_{\mathbf{x}'} P(\mathbf{x}' \mid \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) h_j(\mathbf{x}').$$

The objective of the agents is to coordinate and find a joint action that maximizes  $Q(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) = \sum_{j=1}^{g} Q_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a})$ . However, computing  $Q_j$ 's naively would require an enumeration of every one of the exponentially many states. This computation can be simplified dramatically by using a factored backprojection [10] to replace the above expectation. Here, we extend this construction to exploit rule functions.

First, note that  $h_j$  is a rule function, which can be written as  $h_j(\mathbf{x}') = \sum_i \rho_i^{(h_j)}(\mathbf{x}')$ , where  $\rho_i^{(h_j)}$  has the form  $\left\langle \rho_i^{(h_j)}, \mathbf{c}_i^{(h_j)} : v_i^{(h_j)} \right\rangle$ . Each rule is a restricted domain function; thus, we can write the expected value  $g_i$  of receiving  $h_i$ 

at the next time step, a procedure called backprojection, as:  

$$g_{j}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) = \sum_{\mathbf{x}'} P(\mathbf{x}' \mid \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) h_{j}(\mathbf{x}')$$

$$= \sum_{\mathbf{x}'} P(\mathbf{x}' \mid \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) \sum_{i} \rho_{i}^{(h_{j})}(\mathbf{x}');$$

$$= \sum_{i} \sum_{\mathbf{x}'} P(\mathbf{x}' \mid \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) \rho_{i}^{(h_{j})}(\mathbf{x}');$$

$$= \sum_{i} v_{i}^{(h_{j})} P(\mathbf{c}_{i}^{(h_{j})} \mid \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a});$$

```
RuleBackproj(\rho), where \rho is given by \langle \rho, \mathbf{c} : v \rangle.
     g = \{\}.
     Generate a set \mathcal{P} of relevant probability rules: \mathcal{P} =
        \{\pi_j \in P(X_i' \mid Parents(X_i')) \mid X_i \text{ assigned in c and } \}
        c is compatible with c_j }.
     Remove X' assignments from the context of all rules
     // Multiply compatible rules:
     While there are two compatible rules \langle \rho_1, c_1 : p_1 \rangle
        and \langle \rho_2, \mathbf{c}_2 : p_2 \rangle:
                replace these two rules by the set:
                Residual (\rho_1, c_2) \cup Residual (\rho_2, c_1) \cup
                (\mathbf{c}_1 \wedge \mathbf{c} : p_1 p_2).
    // Generate value rules:
     For each rule \pi_i in \mathcal{P}:
             g = g \cup \{\langle \mathbf{c}_i : p_i v \rangle\}.
```

Figure 4: Rule-based backprojection.

where the term  $v_i^{(h_j)}P(\mathbf{c}_i^{(h_j)} \mid \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a})$  can be written as a rule function. We denote this operation by  $RuleBackproj(\rho_i^{(h_j)})$ and describe the procedure in Fig. 4. Thus, we can write the backprojection of  $h_j$  as:

$$g_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) = \sum_i RuleBackproj(\rho_i^{(h_j)}); \tag{1}$$

where  $g_j$  is a sum of rule-based functions, and therefore also a rule-based function. For notation purposes, we will use  $g_j = RuleBackproj(h_j)$  to refer to this definition of backprojection.

Using this notation, we can write the local utilities  $Q_i$  as:  $Q_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) = r_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) + g_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a});$ 

which is again a rule-based function. Thus, we can decompose Q as a set of rule-based functions  $Q_j$ , one for each agent, which depend only on the current state x and action choice a. This is exactly the case we addressed in Section 3.1. Therefore, we can perform efficient one-step lookahead planning using the same coordination graph.

### **Multi-Agent Sequential Decision Making**

We now turn our attention to the substantially more complex case where the agents are acting in a dynamic environment and are trying to jointly maximize their expected long-term return. The Markov Decision Process (MDP) framework formalizes this problem. We begin by describing the MDP framework in general, and then discussing how the techniques described in the previous section can be used to allow agents to make optimal collaborative decisions in context-sensitive dynamic settings.

### 5.1 Markov Decision Processes

An MDP is defined as a 4-tuple (X, A, R, P) where: X is a finite set of N = |X| states; A is a set of actions; R is a reward function  $\mathcal{R}: \mathbf{X} \times \mathcal{A} \mapsto \mathbf{IR}$ , such that  $\mathcal{R}(\mathbf{x}, a)$  represents the reward obtained in state x after taking action a; and P is a Markovian transition model where  $P(\mathbf{x}' \mid \mathbf{x}, a)$  represents the probability of going from state x to state x' with action a.

We assume that the MDP has an infinite horizon and that future rewards are discounted exponentially with a discount factor  $\gamma \in [0, 1)$ . A stationary policy  $\pi$  for an MDP is a mapping  $\pi: X \mapsto A$ , where  $\pi(x)$  is the action the agent takes at state x. The optimal value function  $\mathcal{V}^*$  is defined so that the value of a state must be the maximal value achievable by any action at that state. More precisely, we define  $Q_{\mathcal{V}}(\mathbf{x},a) = R(\mathbf{x},a) + \gamma \sum_{\mathbf{x}'} P(\mathbf{x}' \mid \mathbf{x},a) \mathcal{V}(\mathbf{x}')$ , and the Bellman operator  $\mathcal{T}^*$  to be  $\mathcal{T}^*\mathcal{V}(\mathbf{x}) = \max_a Q_{\mathcal{V}}(\mathbf{x},a)$ . The optimal value function  $\mathcal{V}^*$  is the fixed point of  $\mathcal{T}^*$ :  $\mathcal{V}^* = \mathcal{T}^*\mathcal{V}^*$ .

For any value function  $\mathcal{V}$ , we can define the policy obtained by acting greedily relative to  $\mathcal{V}$ :  $Greedy(\mathcal{V})(\mathbf{x}) = \arg\max_a Q_{\mathcal{V}}(\mathbf{x}, a)$ . The greedy policy relative to the optimal value function  $\mathcal{V}^*$  is the optimal policy  $\pi^* = Greedy(\mathcal{V}^*)$ .

There are several algorithms for computing the optimal policy. One is via linear programming. Our variables are  $V_1, \ldots, V_N$ , where  $V_i$  represents  $\mathcal{V}(\mathbf{x}^{(i)})$  with  $\mathbf{x}^{(i)}$  referring to the *i*th state. Our LP is:

Minimize:  $\alpha'V$ ;

Subject to:  $V_i \geq R(\mathbf{x}^{(i)}, a) + \gamma \sum_j P(\mathbf{x}^{(j)} \mid \mathbf{x}^{(i)}, a) V_j$  $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, N\}, a \in \mathcal{A}.$ 

Where the state relevance weights  $\alpha$  can be any positive weight vector such that  $\alpha(\mathbf{x}) > 0$ ,  $\forall \mathbf{x}$  and  $\sum_{\mathbf{x}} \alpha(\mathbf{x}) = 1$ , i.e., we can think of  $\alpha$  as a probability distribution over the states.

In our setting, the state space is exponentially large, with one state for each assignment x to X. We use the common approach of restricting attention to value functions that are compactly represented as a linear combination of basis functions  $H = \{h_1, \ldots, h_k\}$ . A linear value function over H is a function  $\mathcal{V}$  that can be written as  $\mathcal{V}(x) = \sum_{j=1}^k w_j h_j(x)$  for some coefficients  $\mathbf{w} = (w_1, \ldots, w_k)'$ . It is useful to define an  $|X| \times k$  matrix A whose columns are the k basis functions, viewed as vectors. Our approximate value function is then represented by  $A\mathbf{w}$ .

The linear programming approach can be adapted to use this value function representation [12] by changing the objective function to  $\alpha \cdot A\mathbf{w}$ , and changing the constraints to have the form,  $A\mathbf{w} \geq \mathcal{T}^*A\mathbf{w}$ . In this approximate formulation, the variables are  $w_1, \ldots, w_k$ , i.e., the weights for our basis functions. The LP is given by:

Variables:  $w_1, \dots, w_k$ ; Minimize:  $\sum_{\mathbf{x}} \alpha(\mathbf{x}) \sum_i w_i \ h_i(\mathbf{x})$ ; Subject to:  $\sum_i w_i \ h_i(\mathbf{x}) \ge R(\mathbf{x}, a) + \gamma \sum_{\mathbf{x}'} P(\mathbf{x}' \mid \mathbf{x}, a) \sum_i w_i \ h_i(\mathbf{x}')$  $\forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}, \forall a \in A.$ 

In other words, this formulation takes the exact LP and substitutes the explicit state value function by a linear value function representation  $\sum_i w_i \ h_i(\mathbf{x})$ , or, in our more compact notation,  $\mathcal{V}$  is replaced by  $A\mathbf{w}$ . There is, in general, no guarantee as to the quality of the approximation  $A\mathbf{w}$ , but the recent work of de Farias and Van Roy [4] provides some analysis of the error relative to that of the best possible approximation in the subspace, and some guidance as to selecting  $\alpha$  so as to improve the quality of the approximation. This transformation has the effect of reducing the number of free variables in the LP to k (one for each basis function coefficient), but the number of constraints remains  $|\mathbf{X}| \times |\mathcal{A}|$ . In the next section, we discuss how we can use the structure of a factored MDP to provide a compact representation and efficient solution of this LP.

#### 5.2 Factored MDPs

Factored MDPs [2] allow the representation of large structured MDPs by using a dynamic Bayesian network to represent the transition model. Our representation of the one-step transition dynamics in Section 4 is precisely a factored MDP, where we factor not only the states but also the actions.

In [10], we proposed the use of factored linear value functions to approximate the value function in a factored MDP. These value functions are a weighted linear combination of basis functions, as above, but where each basis function is restricted to depend only on a small subset of state variables. The h functions in Fig. 3 are an example. In this paper, we extend the factored value function concept to rules. Thus, each basis function  $h_j$  is a rule function. If we had a value function  $\mathcal{V}$  represented in this way, then we could use our algorithm of Section 4 to implement  $Greedy(\mathcal{V})$  by having the agents use our message passing coordination algorithm at each step.

First, consider the objective function of the LP in (2):

Objective = 
$$\sum_{\mathbf{x}} \alpha(\mathbf{x}) \sum_{j} w_{j} h_{j}(\mathbf{x})$$
.

Representing such an objective function explicitly would require a summation over all the exponentially large state space. However, we can use structure in the rule functions to represent this objective function compactly. Note that:

Objective = 
$$\sum_{j} w_{j} \sum_{\mathbf{x}} \alpha(\mathbf{x}) h_{j}(\mathbf{x});$$
  
=  $\sum_{j} w_{j} \sum_{i} \sum_{\mathbf{x}} \alpha(\mathbf{x}) \rho_{i}^{(h_{j})}(\mathbf{x});$   
=  $\sum_{j} w_{j} \sum_{i} v_{i}^{(h_{j})} \alpha(\mathbf{c}_{i}^{(h_{j})}) = \sum_{j} w_{j} \alpha_{j};$ 

where  $\alpha(\mathbf{c}_i^{(h_j)}) = \sum_{\{\mathbf{x} \text{ consitent with } \mathbf{c}_i^{(h_j)}\}} \alpha(\mathbf{x})$ , i.e., we are marginalizing out from  $\alpha$  all variables that do not appear in the context of the rule. Such computation can be very efficient if we use a factored representation for the state relevance weights  $\alpha$ , e.g., a Bayesian network. In our experiments, we used an uniform distribution. Here,  $\alpha(\mathbf{c}_i^{(h_j)})$  is simply  $1/\left|\mathbf{C}_i^{(h_j)}\right|$ . Using this method, we can precompute one coefficient  $\alpha_j$  for each basis function and our objective function simply becomes  $\sum_j w_j \alpha_j$ .

The second step is the representation of the constraints:

$$\sum_{i} w_{i} \ h_{i}(\mathbf{x}) \geq R(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) + \gamma \sum_{\mathbf{x}'} P(\mathbf{x}' \mid \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) \sum_{i} w_{i} \ h_{i}(\mathbf{x}');$$

$$\forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}, \forall \mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}.$$

Although there are exponentially many constraints, we can replace these constraints by an equivalent set which is exponentially smaller. In previous work, we have applied such transformation in the context of single agent problems [7] and table-based multiagent factored MDPs [8]. We will now extend these ideas to exploit the rule-based representation of our reward and basis functions.

First, note that the constraints above can be replaced by a single, nonlinear constraint:

$$0 \ge \max_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}} \left[ R(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) + \sum_{i} (\gamma g_i(\mathbf{x}) - h_i(\mathbf{x})) w_i \right];$$

where  $g_i = RuleBackproj(h_i) = \sum_{\mathbf{x}'} P(\mathbf{x}' \mid \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}) h_i(\mathbf{x}')$ , which can be computed as described in Section 4.2. Although, a naive approach to maximizing over the state space would require the enumeration of every state, as we have shown in Section 3.1, the structure in rule functions allow us to perform such maximization very efficiently. We are going to apply the same intuition to decompose this nonlinear constraint into a set of linear constraints following a very similar procedure to variable elimination.

More generally, suppose we wish to enforce the constraint  $0 \ge \max_{\mathbf{y}} F^{\mathbf{w}}(\mathbf{y})$ , where  $F^{\mathbf{w}}(\mathbf{y}) = \sum_{j} f_{j}^{\mathbf{w}}(\mathbf{y})$  such that each  $f_{j}$  is a rule; in the multiagent case we are considering  $\mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{X} \cup \mathbf{A}$ . The superscript  $\mathbf{w}$  means that  $f_{j}$  might depend on  $\mathbf{w}$ . Specifically, if  $f_{j}$  comes from a basis function, it would be multiplied by some weight  $w_{i}$ ; if  $f_{j}$  is a rule from the reward function, it will not.

In our factored linear program, we generate LP variables, which we are going to associate with contexts; we call these LP rules. An LP rule has the form  $\langle e, c : u \rangle$ ; it is associated with a context c and a variable u in the linear program. We begin by transforming all our original rules  $f_j^w$  into LP rules as follows: If rule  $f_j$  has the form  $\langle \rho_j, c_j : v_j \rangle$ ; and comes from basis function i, we introduce an LP rule  $\langle e_j, c_j : u_j \rangle$  and the equality constraint  $u_j = w_i v_j$ ; if  $f_j$  has the same form but comes from a reward function, we introduce an LP rule of the same form, but the equality constraint  $u_j = v_j$ .

Now, we have only LP rules and need to represent the constraint:  $0 \ge \max_{\mathbf{y}} \sum_{j} e_{j}(\mathbf{y})$ . To represent such constraint, we follow an algorithm very similar to the variable elimination procedure in Section 3.1. The main difference occurs in the MaxOut(f, B) operation in Fig. 2. Instead of generating new value rules, we generate new LP rules, with associated new variables and new constraints. The simplest case occurs when computing a residual or adding two LP rules. For example, when we would add two value rules in the original algorithm, we instead perform the following operation on their associated LP rules: If the LP rules are  $\langle e_i, c_i : u_i \rangle$ and  $\langle e_j, c_j : u_j \rangle$ , we create a new rule with context  $c_i \wedge c_j$ whose value should be  $u_i + u_j$ . To enforce this last constraint, we simply create a new LP variable  $u_k$  associated with the rule  $\langle e_k, c_i \wedge c_j : u_k \rangle$  and add an additional constraint  $u_k = u_i + u_j$ . A similar procedure can be followed when computing the residuals.

More interesting constraints are generated when we perform a maximization. In the original algorithm in Fig. 2 this occurs when we create a new rule  $\langle c: \max_i v_i \rangle$ . Following the same process as in the LP rule summation above, if we were maximizing  $\langle e_i, B = b_i \wedge c_i : u_i \rangle, \forall b_i \in \mathrm{Dom}(B)$ , we can generate a new LP variable  $u_k$  associated with the rule  $\langle e_k, c: u_k \rangle$ . However, we cannot add the nonlinear constraint  $u_k = \max_i u_i$ , but we can add a set of equivalent linear constraints  $u_k \geq u_i$ , for each i.

Therefore, using these simple operations, we can exploit structure in the rule functions to represent the nonlinear constraint  $e_n \geq \max_{\mathbf{y}} \sum_j e_j(\mathbf{y})$ , where  $e_n$  is the very last LP rule we generate. A final constraint  $u_n = 0$  implies that we are representing exactly the constraints in the LP of (2), without having to enumerate every state and action. This exponential saving will allow us to solve very large rule-based factored MDPs very efficiently.

More interestingly, this structure can give rise to very in-

teresting coordination behavior. The value functions that we construct using this LP algorithm are rule-based functions. These are the value functions used as the one-step lookahead in Section 4. Assuming that the reward function and transition model have a similar structure, we will get an overall value function that is also a rule-based function. This value function is the one that is used at each stage of the MDP for the agents to select an optimal joint action. As discussed in Section 3.1, the use of rule-based functions allows the agents to use the coordination graph as a data structure which the agents can use to jointly select optimal actions in a distributed way.

It is important to note that, although the same value function is used at all steps in the MDP, the actual coordination structure varies substantially between steps. As we discussed, the coordination graph depends on the state variable assignment x, so that in different states the coordination pattern changes.


Furthermore, as we discussed, the coordination also depends on the numerical values of the value rules; i.e., sometimes dominance of one action over another will allow the elimination of a coordination step without losing optimality. Thus, even an MDP with the same structure and the same set of value rules, a different set of reward values might lead to a different coordination strategy.


Finally, we observe that the structure of the computed value rules determines the nature of the coordination. In some cases, we may be willing to introduce another approximation into our value function, in order to reduce the complexity of the coordination process. In particular, if we have a value rule  $\langle \rho, \mathbf{c} : v \rangle$  where v is relatively small, then we might be willing to simply drop it from the rule set. If  $\mathbf{c}$  involves the actions of several agents, dropping  $\rho$  from our rule-based function might substantially reduce the amount of coordination required.


#### 6 Experimental results

We tested our new rule-based algorithm on a variation of the multiagent SysAdmin problem presented in [8]. In this problem, there is a network of computers and each computer is associated with an administrator agent. Here, the dynamic system associated with each machine is represented with an agent  $A_i$  and three variables: Status  $S_i \in \{\text{good, faulty,}\}$ dead}, Load  $L_i \in \{\text{idle, loaded, process successful}\}\$ and Neighbor Message  $M_i \in \{1, ..., \sharp \text{ neighbors}\}$ . The system receives a reward of 1 if a process terminates successfully (in the ring topologies, one machine receives reward of 2 to break symmetry). If the Status is faulty, processes take longer to terminate. If the machine dies, the process is lost. Each agent A: must decide whether machine i should be rebooted, in which case the Status becomes good and any running process is lost. Machines become faulty and die with small probabilities. However, a dead neighbor on the network may transmit bad packets, considerably increasing the probability that a machine will become faulty and die. This neighbor interaction is governed by the NeighborMessage variable, which, at every time step, uniformly selects one neighboring machine

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>It is important to note that, by optimal, we mean optimal relative to the computed value function. The value function itself is an approximation of the long-term optimal value function, and therefore does not guarantee truly optimal behavior.










Figure 5: Bidirectional ring: (a) Number of LP constraints; (b) Running time. Other running times: (c) Unidirectional ring; (d) Inverted star.

to receive packets from. For a network of n machines, the number of states in the MDP is  $9^n$  and the joint action space contains  $2^n$  possible actions, e.g., a problem with 30 agents has over  $10^{28}$  states and a billion possible actions.

We implemented the rule-based factored approximate linear programming and the message passing coordination algorithms in C++, using CPLEX as the LP solver. We experimented with "single" basis functions, which contains a rule basis function for each joint value of each  $S_i$  and  $L_i$ . We use  $\gamma=0.95$ . Three network topologies were considered: bidirectional ring, where machine i can communicate with machine i+1 and i-1 (mod n); unidirectional ring, where machine i can communicate only with machine i+1 (mod n); and reverse star, where every machine can send packets only to machine 1.

For bidirectional ring, for example, as shown in Fig. 5(a), the total number of constraints generated grows *linearly* with the number of agents. Furthermore, the rule-based (CSI) approach generates considerably fewer constraints than the table-based approach (non-CSI). However, the constant overhead of managing rules causes the rule-based approach to be about two times slower than the table-based approach, as shown in Fig. 5(b). Similar observations can be made in the unidirectional ring case in Fig. 5(c).

However, note that in ring topologies the number of parents for each variable in the DDN and the induced width of the coordination graph are constant as the number of agents increases. On the other hand, in the reverse star topology, every machine in the network can affect the status of machine 1, as all machines can send it (potentially bad) packets. Thus, the number of parents of  $S_1$  increases with the number of computers in the network. In this case, we observe quite a different behavior, as seen in Fig. 5(d). In the table-based approach, the tables grow exponentially with the number of agents, yielding an exponential running time. On the other hand, the size of the rule set only grows linearly, yielding a quadratic total running time.

Notice that in all topologies, the sizes of the state and action spaces are growing exponentially with the number of machines. Nonetheless, the total running time is only growing quadratically. This exponential gain has allowed us to run very large problems, with over  $10^{124}$  states.

### 7 Conclusion

We have provided principled and efficient approach to planning in multiagent domains. We show that the task of finding an optimal joint action relative to a rule-based value function leads to a very natural communication pattern, where agents send messages along a *coordination* graph determined by the structure of the value rules. Rather than placing a priori restrictions on the communication structure between agents, the coordination structure dynamically changes according to the

state of the system, and even on the actual numerical values assigned to the value rules. Furthermore, the coordination graph can be adapted incrementally as the agents learn new rules or discard unimportant ones.

Our initial experimental results are very promising. By exploiting rule structure in both the state and action spaces, we can deal with considerably larger MDPs than those described in previous work. In a family of multiagent network administration problems, the algorithm tackles MDPs with over  $10^{124}$  states and over  $10^{39}$  actions. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the rule-based method can scale polynomially as the size of parent sets increases, as opposed to the exponential growth of the table-based method. We believe that the adaptive coordination graph presented here will provide a well-founded schema for other multiagent collaboration and communication approaches.

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