

Logic Programming with Ordered Disjunction

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Abstract

Logic programs with ordered disjunction (*LPODs*) combine ideas underlying Qualitative Choice Logic (Brewka, Benferhat, & Le Berre 2002) and answer set programming. Logic programming under answer set semantics is extended with a new connective called ordered disjunction. The new connective allows us to represent alternative, ranked options for problem solutions in the heads of rules: $A \times B$ intuitively means: if possible A , but if A is not possible then at least B . The semantics of logic programs with ordered disjunction is based on a preference relation on answer sets. *LPODs* are useful for applications in design and configuration and can serve as a basis for qualitative decision making.

Introduction

In a recent paper (Brewka, Benferhat, & Le Berre 2002) a propositional logic called Qualitative Choice Logic (*QCL*) was introduced. The logic contains a new connective \times representing ordered disjunction. Intuitively, $A \times B$ stands for: if possible A , but if A is impossible then (at least) B . This connective allows context dependent preferences to be represented in a simple and elegant fashion. As a simple example consider the preferences for booking a hotel for a conference. Assume the most preferred option is to be within walking distance from the conference site, the second best option is to have transportation provided by the hotel, the third best is public transportation. This can simply be represented as

walking \times *hotel-transport* \times *public-transport*

From a description of available hotels, a disjunction expressing that one of the hotels must be picked, and the above formula *QCL* is able to derive the hotel which satisfies best the given preferences (if there is more than one such hotel a corresponding disjunction is concluded).

The semantics of the logic is based on degrees of satisfaction of a formula in a classical model. The degrees, intuitively, measure disappointment and induce a preference relation on models. Consequence is defined in terms of most

preferred models. It is argued in that paper that there are numerous useful applications, e.g. in configuration and design.

In this paper we want to combine ideas underlying *QCL* with logic programming. More precisely, we want to investigate logic programs based on rules with ordered disjunction in the heads. We call such programs logic programs with ordered disjunction (*LPODs*).

The semantical framework in which the investigation will be carried out is that of answer set semantics (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1991). Logic programs under answer set semantics have emerged as a new promising programming paradigm dubbed answer set programming. There are numerous interesting AI applications of answer set programming, for instance in planning (Lifschitz 2001) and configuration (Soininen 2000). One of the reasons for this success is the availability of highly efficient systems for computing answer sets like *smodels* (Niemelä & Simons 1997) and *dlv* (Eiter *et al.* 1998).

We think it is worthwhile to investigate simple representations of context dependent preferences in the answer set programming paradigm. Our combination of ideas from *QCL* and answer set programming will lead to an approach which is less expressive than *QCL* in one respect: the syntax of *LPODs* restricts the appearance of ordered disjunction to the head of rules. On the other hand, we inherit from answer set programming the nonmonotonic aspects which are due to default negation. This allows us to combine default knowledge with knowledge about preferences and desires in a simple and elegant way.

The basic intuition underlying our approach can be described as follows: we will use the ordered disjunctions in rule heads to select some of the answer sets of a program as the preferred ones. Consider a program containing the rule

$$A \times B \leftarrow C$$

If S_1 is an answer set containing C and A and S_2 is an answer set containing C and B but not A , then - ceteris paribus (other things being equal) - S_1 is preferred over S_2 . Of course, we have to give precise meaning to the ceteris paribus phrase. Intuitively ceteris paribus is to be read as S_1 and S_2 satisfy the other rules in the program equally well.

We will show that under certain conditions reasoning from most preferred answer sets yields optimal problem solutions. In more general decision making settings the pref-

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erence relation on answer sets provides a basis for best possible choices given a specific decision strategy.

We will restrict our discussion in this paper to propositional programs. However, as usual in answer set programming, we admit rule schemata containing variables bearing in mind that these schemata are just convenient representations for the set of their ground instances.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce syntax and semantics of *LPODs*. We define the degree of satisfaction of a rule in an answer set and show how to use the degrees to determine a preference relation on answer sets. Conclusions are defined as the literals true in all preferred answer sets. The subsequent section discusses some simple examples and potential applications. We then investigate implementation issues. The following section shows how *LPODs* can serve as a basis for a qualitative decision making. The last section discusses related work and concludes.

Logic programs with ordered disjunction

Logic programming with ordered disjunction is an extension of logic

programming with two kinds of negation (default and strong negation) (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1991). The new connective \times representing ordered disjunction is allowed to appear in the head of rules only. A (propositional) *LPOD* thus consists of rules of the form

$$C_1 \times \dots \times C_n \leftarrow A_1, \dots, A_m, \text{not } B_1, \dots, \text{not } B_k$$

where the C_i , A_j and B_l are ground literals.

The intuitive reading of the rule head is: if possible C_1 , if C_1 is not possible then C_2 , ..., if all of C_1, \dots, C_{n-1} are not possible then C_n . The literals C_i are called choices of the rule. Extended logic programs with two negations are a special case where $n = 1$ for all rules. As usual we omit \leftarrow whenever $m = 0$ and $k = 0$, that is, if the rule is a fact. Moreover, rules of the form $\leftarrow \text{body}$ (constraints) are used as abbreviations for $p \leftarrow \text{body}$, $\text{not } p$ for some p not appearing in the rest of the program. The effect is that no answer sets containing *body* exist.

Before defining the semantics of *LPODs* a few observations are in order. As already mentioned in the introduction we want to use the ranking of literals in the head of rules to select some of the answer sets of a program as the preferred ones. But what are the answer sets of a program among which to make this selection?

Since ordered disjunction is a particular prioritized form of disjunction it seems like a natural idea to base the semantics of *LPODs* on one of the standard semantics for disjunctive logic programs, for instance Gelfond and Lifschitz's semantics (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1991).

Unfortunately, this doesn't work. The problem is that most of the semantics for disjunctive logic programs have minimality built in. For instance, according to Gelfond and Lifschitz, S is an answer set of a disjunctive logic program P iff S is a minimal set of literals which is logically closed, and closed under the S -reduct of P . The S -reduct of P is obtained from P by (1) deleting all rules r from P such that

not B_j in the body of r and $B_j \in S$, and (2) deleting all default negated literals from the remaining rules. A set of literals S is closed under a rule r if one of the literals in the head of r is in S whenever the body is true in S (see (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1991) for the details).

In this approach answer sets are minimal: if S_1 and S_2 are answer sets of a disjunctive program P and $S_1 \subseteq S_2$, then $S_2 \subseteq S_1$.

Minimality is not always wanted for *LPODs*. Consider the following two facts:

- 1) $A \times B \times C$
- 2) $B \times D$

The single best way of satisfying both ordered disjunctions is obviously to make A and B true, that is, we would expect $\{A, B\}$ to be the single preferred answer set of this simple *LPOD*. However, since B is sufficient to satisfy both disjunctions, the set $\{A, B\}$ is not even an answer set of the corresponding disjunctive logic program (where \times is replaced by \vee) according to the semantics of (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1991): the built in minimality precludes sets containing both A and B from consideration.

We thus have to use a semantics which is not minimal. Indeed, there is such a semantics, the possible models semantics proposed by Sakama and Inoue (Sakama & Inoue 1994). It is based on so-called split programs, that is, disjunction free programs which contain arbitrary subsets of single head rules obtained from disjunctive rules by deleting all but one alternatives in the head.

Unfortunately, also this semantics is inadequate, this time for opposite reasons: it admits too many literals in answer sets. Consider the disjunctive logic program

- 1) $A \vee B \vee C$

There are seven split programs corresponding to the nonempty subsets of the literals of the fact. The split program containing the facts A, B, C generates the possible model where A, B, C is true.

Let us replace disjunction by ordered disjunction in this formula. According to our intuitive discussion we want to read the rule as "if possible A , if this is not possible then B , and if also B is not possible then C ". Under this reading models containing more than one of the literals in the head do not seem justified on the basis of a single rule (they may be justified by different rules, though).

For this reason we will not allow cases where a single rule of the original program gives rise to more than one rule in the split program. There is a further complication: consider the program:

- 1) $A \times B \times C$
- 2) A

We do not want to obtain $\{A, B\}$ as an answer set from the split program consisting of these 2 atomic facts since again this does not correspond to the intuitive reading of the first rule (B only if A is not possible). We therefore have to use slightly more complicated rules in split programs.

Definition 1 Let $r = C_1 \times \dots \times C_n \leftarrow \text{body}$ be a rule. For $k \leq n$ we define the k th option of r as

$$r^k = C_k \leftarrow \text{body}, \text{not } C_1, \dots, \text{not } C_{k-1}.$$

Definition 2 Let P be an LPOD. P' is a split program of P if it is obtained from P by replacing each rule in P by one of its options.

Here is a simple example. Let P consist of the rules

- 1) $A \times B \leftarrow \text{not } C$
- 2) $B \times C \leftarrow \text{not } D$

We obtain 4 split programs

$$\begin{array}{ll} A \leftarrow \text{not } C & A \leftarrow \text{not } C \\ B \leftarrow \text{not } D & C \leftarrow \text{not } D, \text{not } B \\ \\ B \leftarrow \text{not } C, \text{not } A & B \leftarrow \text{not } C, \text{not } A \\ B \leftarrow \text{not } D & C \leftarrow \text{not } D, \text{not } B \end{array}$$

Split programs do not contain ordered disjunction. We thus can define:

Definition 3 Let P be an LPOD. A set of literals A is an answer set of P if it is a consistent answer set of a split program P' of P .

We exclude inconsistent answer sets from consideration since they do not represent possible problem solutions. In the example above we obtain 3 answer sets: $\{A, B\}$, $\{C\}$, $\{B\}$. Note that one of the answer sets is a proper subset of another answer set. On the other hand, none of the rules in the original LPOD sanctions more than one literal in any of the answer sets, as intended.

Not all of the answer sets satisfy our most intended options. Clearly, $\{B, A\}$ gives us the best options for both rules, whereas $\{C\}$ gives only the second best option for 2) and $\{B\}$ the second best option for 1). To distinguish between more and less intended answer sets we introduce the degree of satisfaction of a rule in an answer set:

Definition 4 Let S be an answer set of an LPOD P . S satisfies the rule

$$C_1 \times \dots \times C_n \leftarrow A_1, \dots, A_m, \text{not } B_1, \dots, \text{not } B_k$$

- to degree 1 if $A_j \notin S$, for some j , or $B_i \in S$, for some i ,
- to degree j ($1 \leq j \leq n$) if all $A_j \in S$, no $B_i \in S$, and $j = \min\{r \mid C_r \in S\}$.

Proposition 1 If A is an answer set of P then A satisfies all rules of P to some degree.¹

Proof: Let r be a rule of P . If S is an answer set of P , then there is a split program P' such that S is an answer set of P' . Let r^i be the rule in P' generated from r . Since S is an answer set of P' either the body of r^i is satisfied in S and thus C_i is contained in S , in which case r is satisfied to degree i or smaller, or the body of r^i is not satisfied in S , in which case r is satisfied to degree 1 in S , or there is a better choice than C_k , $k < i$, in S and r is satisfied to degree k . \square We use the degrees of satisfaction of a rule to define a preference relation on answer sets. There are different ways of doing this. For instance, we could simply add up the satisfaction degrees of all rules and prefer

¹The other direction of the proposition does obviously not hold. For example, the set $\{A\}$ satisfies the rule $B \leftarrow \text{not } A$, but is not an answer set for the program consisting of this single rule.

those answer sets where the total sum is minimal. Although this may be reasonable in certain applications, this approach makes quite strong assumptions about the commensurability of choices in different rule heads. In (Brewka, Benferhat, & Le Berre 2002) a lexicographic ordering of models based on the number of premises satisfied to a particular degree was proposed. This lexicographic ordering has a highly syntactic flavour. Therefore, we will use here a somewhat more cautious preference relation (in the sense that fewer answer sets are considered better than others) based on set inclusion of the rules satisfied to certain degrees:

Definition 5 For a set of literals S , let $S^i(P)$ denote the set of rules in P satisfied by S to degree i . Let S_1 and S_2 be answer sets of an LPOD P . S_1 is preferred to S_2 ($S_1 > S_2$) iff there is i such that $S_2^i(P) \subset S_1^i(P)$, and for all $j < i$, $S_1^j(P) = S_2^j(P)$.

Definition 6 A set of literals S is a preferred answer set of an LPOD P iff S is an answer set of P and there is no answer set S' of P such that $S' > S$.

Definition 7 A literal l is a conclusion of an LPOD P iff l is contained in all preferred answer sets of P .

Consider again the program

- 1) $A \times B \leftarrow \text{not } C$
- 2) $B \times C \leftarrow \text{not } D$

As discussed before we obtain the 3 answer sets: $S_1 = \{A, B\}$, $S_2 = \{C\}$ and $S_3 = \{B\}$. S_1 satisfies both rules with degree 1, $\{C\}$ satisfies 1) to degree 1 but 2) to degree 2. $\{B\}$ satisfies 1) to degree 2 and 2) to degree 1. The single preferred answer set is thus S_1 , as intended, and A and B are the conclusions of the program.

Examples

LPODs allow us - like normal logic programs - to express incomplete and defeasible knowledge through the use of default negation. In addition, they provide means to represent preferences among intended properties of problem solutions. Moreover, these preferences may depend on the current context.

In this section we discuss several examples illustrating potential uses of LPODs. The first example is about how to spend a free afternoon. You like to go to the beach, but also to the cinema. Normally you prefer the cinema over the beach, unless it is hot (which is the exception in the area where you live, except during the summer). If it is hot the beach is preferred over the cinema. In summer it is normally hot, but there are exceptions. If it rains the beach is out of question. This information can be represented using the following rules:

- 1) $\text{cinema} \times \text{beach} \leftarrow \text{not hot}$
- 2) $\text{beach} \times \text{cinema} \leftarrow \text{hot}$
- 3) $\text{hot} \leftarrow \text{not } \neg \text{hot}, \text{summer}$
- 4) $\neg \text{beach} \leftarrow \text{rain}$

Without further information about the weather we obtain the single preferred answer set $S_1 = \{\text{cinema}\}$. There is no information that it might be hot, so rule 1) will determine the preferences. S_1 satisfies all rules to degree 1.

Now assume the fact *summer* is additionally given. In this case we obtain $S_2 = \{summer, hot, beach\}$ as the single preferred answer set. Again this answer set satisfies all rules to degree 1.

Next assume that, in addition to *summer* also the literal $\neg hot$ is given. The single preferred answer set now is $S_3 = \{summer, \neg hot, cinema\}$. All rules are satisfied to degree 1.

Finally, assume the additional facts are *summer* and *rain*. Now the single preferred answer set (and in fact the single answer set) is

$$S_4 = \{summer, rain, hot, \neg beach, cinema\}.$$

Note that this time it is not possible to satisfy all rules to degree 1: rule 2) is satisfied to degree 2 only. As often in real life, there are situations where the best options simply do not work out.

We think that *LPODs* are very well suited for representing problems where a certain choice has to be made or, more generally, where a number of components have to be chosen for a certain configuration task. The general idea would be to have

- for each component a set of rules describing its properties,
- rules describing which components are needed for the configuration to be complete; this may depend on other components chosen,
- rules describing intended properties of the solution we want to generate. The involved preferences may be context dependent, and
- a description of the case at hand.

In each case default knowledge can be used to describe what is normally the case. Consider the problem of configuring a menu. The menu should consist of a *starter*, a *main* course, a *dessert* and a *beverage*. As a *starter* you prefer *soup* over *salad*. As *main* course *fish*, *beef* and *lasagne* are possible (this is all you are able to cook) and your preferences are in this order. Of course, if the visitor is *vegetarian* the first two (as well as the *soup*) are out of the question. In case of *beef* you prefer *red* wine over *white* wine over mineral *water*, otherwise the order between wines is reversed. Only *ice-coffee* and *tiramisu* is available as a *dessert*. If *tiramisu* is chosen, then an extra *coffee* is necessary. You prefer *espresso* over *cappuccino*.

The possible components thus are *soup*, *salad*, *fish*, *beef*, *lasagne*, *ice-coffee*, *tiramisu*, *espresso*, *cappuccino*, *red*, *white* and *water*. The following properties of the components are relevant:

$$\begin{aligned} \neg \text{vegetarian} &\leftarrow \text{beef} & \text{alcohol} &\leftarrow \text{white} \\ \neg \text{vegetarian} &\leftarrow \text{fish} & \text{alcohol} &\leftarrow \text{red} \\ \neg \text{vegetarian} &\leftarrow \text{soup} \end{aligned}$$

The needed components are

$$\begin{aligned} \text{starter} & & \text{beverage} \\ \text{main} & & \text{coffee} \leftarrow \text{tiramisu} \\ \text{dessert} & & \end{aligned}$$

The preferences are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{soup} \times \text{salad} &\leftarrow \text{starter} \\ \text{fish} \times \text{beef} \times \text{lasagne} &\leftarrow \text{main} \\ \text{red} \times \text{white} \times \text{water} &\leftarrow \text{beverage, beef} \\ \text{white} \times \text{red} \times \text{water} &\leftarrow \text{beverage, not beef} \\ \text{espresso} \times \text{cappuccino} &\leftarrow \text{coffee} \\ \text{ice-coffee} &\leftarrow \text{not tiramisu, dessert} \\ \text{tiramisu} &\leftarrow \text{not ice-coffee, dessert} \end{aligned}$$

Now, given a description of the case at hand, e.g. whether the visitor is vegetarian or not, drinks alcohol or not, likes fish etc. the preferred answer sets will determine a menu which satisfies the preferences as much as possible. The last two rules are necessary to make sure that one of the desserts is picked. For the other courses this is implicit in the specified preferences. In the language of (Niemelä & Simons 2000) these rules can be represented as the cardinality constraint rule $1\{\text{ice-coffee, tiramisu}\}1 \leftarrow \text{dessert}$. Combinations of *LPODs* and such constraints are a topic of further research.

Computation

The first question to ask is whether *LPODs* can simply be reduced to standard logic programs with two kinds of negation. In that case standard answer set programming techniques would be sufficient for computing consequences of *LPODs*. We will show that a seemingly natural translation does not yield the intended answer sets.

Definition 8 The pseudo-translation $\text{trans}(r)$ of a rule

$$r = C_1 \times \dots \times C_n \leftarrow \text{body}$$

is the collection of rules

$$\begin{aligned} C_1 &\leftarrow \text{body, not } \neg C_1 \\ C_2 &\leftarrow \text{body, not } \neg C_2, \neg C_1 \\ &\vdots \\ C_{n-1} &\leftarrow \text{body, not } \neg C_{n-1}, \neg C_1, \dots, \neg C_{n-2} \\ C_n &\leftarrow \text{body, } \neg C_1, \dots, \neg C_{n-1} \end{aligned}$$

where $\neg C$ is the complement of C , that is $\neg C$ if C is an atom and C' if $C = \neg C'$. The pseudo-translation $\text{trans}(P)$ of an *LPOD* P is

$$\text{trans}(P) = \bigcup_{r \in P} \text{trans}(r)$$

The pseudo-translation creates for each option C_i in the head of r a rule with head C_i which has the negation of the better options as additional body literals. In addition, the rule is made defeasible by adding the default negation of the complement of C_i to the body. There is an exception: the rule generated for the last option is not made defeasible this way since at least one of the options must be true whenever the body of the original rule is true.

Although this translation seems natural it does not work. Consider the following example:

- 1) $a \times b$
- 2) $p \leftarrow \text{not } p, a$

The single preferred answer set is $\{b\}$. The pseudo-translation is

- 1) $a \leftarrow \text{not } \neg a$
- 2) $b \leftarrow \neg a$
- 3) $p \leftarrow \text{not } p, a$

The resulting program has no answer set. In fact, we can prove the following proposition:

Proposition 2 *There is no translation trans from LPODs to extended logic programs (without ordered disjunction) such that for each program P the preferred answer sets of P and the answer sets of $\text{trans}(P)$ coincide.*

Proof: The proposition follows from the fact that preferred answer sets of LPODs are not necessarily subset minimal. Consider the program $a \times b; c \times b \leftarrow a; \neg c$. The preferred answer sets are $S_1 = \{b, \neg c\}$ and $S_2 = \{a, b, \neg c\}$. Clearly, $S_1 \subset S_2$. There is thus no extended logic program with these answer sets. \square

Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of translations to programs containing some extra atoms. This is a topic of further study.

An implementation of LPODs on top of a standard answer set prover for non-disjunctive programs is described in (Brewka, Niemelä, & Syrjänen 2002). We compute preferred answer sets of an LPOD P using two programs. A similar approach is used in (Janhunen *et al.* 2000) to compute stable models of disjunctive logic programs using *Smodels*. The two programs are:

- A generator $G(P)$ that creates all answer sets of P ; and
- A tester $T(P, M)$ that checks whether a given answer set M of P is maximally preferred.

The two programs are run in an interleaved fashion. First, the generator constructs an arbitrary answer set M of P . Next, the tester tries to find an answer set M' that is strictly better than M . The tester possesses an answer set M' iff M' is an answer set of P preferred to M . If there is no such M' , we thus know that M is a preferred answer set. Otherwise, we use $G(P)$ to construct the next candidate. When we want to find only one preferred answer set we can save some effort by taking M' directly as the new answer set candidate. We can thus iterate until a maximally preferred answer set is reached.

Since the tester is based on a declarative representation of the preference criterion it is easy to switch between different notions of preference, or to define new ones.

We have constructed a prototype implementation for LPODs based on *Smodels*, an efficient ASP solver developed at Helsinki University of Technology. The generator and tester programs use special rule types of the *Smodels* system, but they can be modified to work with any ASP solver. The prototype implementation is available at <http://www.tcs.hut.fi/Software/smodels/priority>. The mentioned paper contains also complexity results related to LPODs.

Decision Making using LPODs

In Section we discussed several examples illustrating the notions underlying LPODs. The examples were chosen in such a way that the most preferred answer sets in each case

provided the best solutions to the problem at hand. Later in this section we will analyze why this worked for the chosen examples.

In more general decision making settings it is not sufficient to consider the most preferred answer sets only since this amounts to an extremely optimistic view about how the world will behave (this view is sometimes called wishful thinking). As is well-known in decision theory, for realistic models of decision making it is necessary to clearly distinguish what is under the control of the agent (and thus may constitute the agent's decision) from what is not. We will do this by distinguishing a subset of the literals in a program as decision literals.

In this section we describe a general methodology for qualitative decision making based on LPODs. The basic idea is to use LPODs to describe possible actions or decisions and their consequences, states of the world and desired outcomes. The representation of desires induces, through ordered disjunction, a preference ordering on answer sets representing their desirability. Based on this preference ordering an ordering on possible decisions can be defined based on some decision strategy.

Let us describe the necessary steps more precisely:

1. Among the literals in the logical language distinguish a set of decision literals C . C is the set of literals the agent can decide upon. It's the agent's decision which makes them true. A decision is a consistent subset of C .
2. Represent the different alternative decisions which can be made by the agent. This can be done using standard answer set programming techniques. Note that certain options may lead to additional choices that need to be made.
3. Represent the different alternative states of the world. Again standard answer set programming techniques apply.
4. Represent relationships between and consequences of different alternatives.
5. Represent desired properties. This is where ordered disjunction comes into play. Of course, desires may be context-dependent.
6. Use the preference relation on answer sets derived from the satisfaction degrees of rules to induce a preference relation on possible decisions. Of course, there are different ways to do this corresponding to different attitudes of the agent towards risk.
7. Pick one of the most preferred decisions.

We will use Savage's famous rotten egg example (Savage 1954) to illustrate this methodology. An agent is preparing an omelette. 5 fresh eggs are already in the omelette. There is one more egg. It is uncertain whether this egg is fresh or rotten. The agent can

- add it to the omelette which means the whole omelette may be wasted, or
- throw it away, which means one egg may be wasted, or
- put it in a cup, check whether it is ok or not and put it to the omelette in the former case, throw it away in the

latter. In any case, a cup has to be washed if this option is chosen.

In this example, the decision literals correspond to the three possible actions, that is C is the set of literals built from $\{in-omelette, in-cup, throw-away\}$. Here are the rules which generate the possible decisions and states of the world:

$in-omelette \leftarrow not\ in-cup, not\ throw-away$
 $in-cup \leftarrow not\ in-omelette, not\ throw-away$
 $throw-away \leftarrow not\ in-cup, not\ in-omelette$
 $rotten \leftarrow not\ fresh$
 $fresh \leftarrow not\ rotten$

For our example it is not necessary to specify that the different actions and states of the egg are mutually exclusive. It is guaranteed by the rules that only one of the exclusive options is contained in an answer set.

We next define the effects of the different choices:

$5-omelette \leftarrow throw-away$
 $6-omelette \leftarrow fresh, in-omelette$
 $0-omelette \leftarrow rotten, in-omelette$
 $6-omelette \leftarrow fresh, in-cup$
 $5-omelette \leftarrow rotten, in-cup$
 $\neg wash \leftarrow not\ in-cup$
 $wash \leftarrow in-cup$

For the different omelettes we must state that they are mutually inconsistent. We omit the 6 rules necessary for representing this. They are of the form $\neg x-omelette \leftarrow y-omelette$ with $x \neq y$. We finally represent our desires:

$\neg wash \times wash$
 $6-omelette \times 5-omelette \times 0-omelette$

This logic program has the following 6 answer sets

$S_1 = \{6-omelette, \neg wash, fresh, in-omelette\}$
 $S_2 = \{0-omelette, \neg wash, rotten, in-omelette\}$
 $S_3 = \{6-omelette, wash, fresh, in-cup\}$
 $S_4 = \{5-omelette, wash, rotten, in-cup\}$
 $S_5 = \{5-omelette, \neg wash, fresh, throw-away\}$
 $S_6 = \{5-omelette, \neg wash, rotten, throw-away\}$

The preference relation among answer sets is as follows: S_1 is the single maximally preferred answer set. S_5 and S_6 are preferred to S_2 and S_4 but incomparable to S_3 . S_3 is preferred to S_4 but incomparable to S_5 , S_6 and S_2 . S_2 and S_4 are incomparable. Fig. 1 illustrates these relationships:




Fig.1: Preferences among answer sets

Reasoning from maximally preferred answer sets in the example would yield $in-omelette$ as the alternative chosen by the agent. It is obvious that this amounts to an extremely

optimistic attitude towards decision making which in the example amounts to assuming the egg will be fresh.

A pessimistic decision maker might choose the action whose worst outcome is most tolerable. In the example the answer sets containing $throw-away$, that is S_5 and S_6 , are preferred to the least preferred answer set containing $in-omelette$, S_2 , and to the least preferred answer set containing $in-cup$, S_4 . Thus, a pessimistic decision maker would choose $throw-away$.

An extremely cautious strategy would prefer a decision C_1 over a decision C_2 if the least preferred answer set(s) containing C_1 are preferred to the most preferred answer set(s) containing C_2 . This is a very strong requirement and in the egg example no action is preferred to another one according to this strategy.

Finally, we can distinguish a set of state literals Σ and compare answer sets statewise (states are subsets of Σ , the states in the example are $fresh$ and $rotten$). A decision C_1 is preferred over a decision C_2 if for each state $T \subseteq \Sigma$ the least preferred answer set(s) containing $C_1 \cup T$ are preferred to the most preferred answer set(s) containing $C_2 \cup T$.

Intuitively, S_2 in our example seems far less desirable than S_4 and both S_5 and S_6 less desirable than S_3 . This is not reflected in our preference relation on answer sets. To express this it is necessary to represent preferences between sets of literals rather than single literals.

Within our framework this can be done by introducing new atoms representing conjunctions of literals. However, it would probably be more elegant to apply ordered disjunction directly to sets of literals (read as the conjunction of these literals). Extending LPODs in such a way is straightforward.

Another natural idea would be to use numerical penalties. We can use integers for this and write, say:

$\neg wash-cup \times wash-cup (1)$
 $6-omelette \times 5-omelette (5) \times 0-omelette (50)$

The overall penalty for an answer set S is obtained by adding up the penalties for all rules, where the penalty of $c_1 \times c_2(n_2) \times \dots \times c_k(n_k) \leftarrow body$ is 0 if $body$ is not satisfied in S or $c_1 \in S, n_j$ otherwise, where j is the smallest integer such that $c_j \in S$. The preference relation among answer sets is obtained through their overall penalty. In the example we would obtain the following overall penalties:

$S_1 : 0$	$S_3 : 1$	$S_5 : 5$
$S_6 : 5$	$S_4 : 6$	$S_2 : 50$

Choices could then be ordered on the basis of the average penalties of answer sets they contain. This strategy would thus choose $in-cup$.

Of course, many alternative strategies can be thought of. A further investigation is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future work.

Every approach to qualitative decision making has to combine preferences among outcomes of choices with a treatment of uncertainty. In our approach the preferences are described through ordered disjunction. But what about the uncertainty? Different possible states of the world are represented as different answer sets. As usual in nonmonotonic reasoning states of the world which are unnormal in some respect are totally disregarded (this is what McCarthy called

jumping to conclusions). All states which have to be taken into account are considered plausible. Further distinctions between the generated answer sets are not possible. For instance, it is not possible to express, say, that *fresh* is more probable than *rotten* in the omelette example. If, however the possibility of *rotten* is negligible and *fresh* is true by default we can make sure that only answer sets containing *fresh* are generated by using adequate rules. Our general qualitative attitude towards

uncertainty can thus be described as: states are either negligible or plausible; in the latter case no assumption about the degree of plausibility is made.

We are now in a position to analyze why the examples in Sect. which were based on reasoning from most preferred answer sets worked out properly. The reason is that in these examples only one answer set for the different possible choices (which were left implicit) is generated. This means that optimistic, pessimistic and other kinds of LPOD based decision making coincide. In general, this is possible whenever there is enough knowledge to guarantee a single plausible state for each case at hand (as in the cinema example), or whenever all relevant literals are under the control of the agent (as in the cooking example).

Conclusion

In this paper we introduced a new connective to logic programming. This connective - called ordered disjunction - can be used to represent context dependent preferences in a simple and elegant way. Logic programming with ordered disjunction has interesting applications, in particular in design and configuration, and it can serve as a basis for qualitative decision models.

There are numerous papers introducing preferences to logic programming. For an overview of some of these approaches see the discussion in (Brewka & Eiter 1999) or the more recent (Schaub & Wang 2001). Only few of these proposals allow for context dependent preferences. Such preferences are discussed for instance in (Brewka 1996; Brewka & Eiter 1999). The representation of the preferences in these papers is based on the introduction of names for rules, the explicit representation of the preference relation among rules in the logical language, and a sophisticated reformulation of the central semantic notion (answer set, extension, etc.) with a highly self-referential flavour. Alternative approaches (Delgrande, Schaub, & Tompits 2000; Grosz 1999) are based on compilation techniques and make heavy use of meta-predicates in the logical language. Nothing like this is necessary in our approach. All we have to do is use the degree of satisfaction of a rule to define a preference relation on answer sets directly.

Our approach is closely related to work in qualitative decision theory, for an overview see (Doyle & Thomason 1999). Poole (Poole 1997) aims at a combination of logic and decision theory. His approach incorporates quantitative utilities whereas our preferences are qualitative. Interestingly, Poole uses a logic *without* disjunction whereas we *enhance* disjunction. In (Boutilier *et al.* 1999) a graphical representation, somewhat reminiscent of Bayes nets, for conditional preferences among feature values under the

ceteris paribus principle is proposed, together with corresponding algorithms. LPODs are more general and offer means to reason defeasibly. Several models of qualitative decision making based on possibility theory are described in (Dubois *et al.* 1999; Benferhat *et al.* 2000). They are based on certainty and desirability rankings. Some of them make strong commensurability assumptions with respect to these rankings. In a series of papers (Lang 1996; van der Torre & Weydert 2001), originally motivated by (Boutilier 1994), the authors propose viewing conditional desires as constraints on utility functions. Intuitively, $D(a|b)$ stands for: the b -worlds with highest utility satisfy a . Our interpretation of ranked options is very different. Rather than being based on decision theory our approach can be viewed as giving a particular interpretation to the *ceteris paribus* principle.

In future work we plan to investigate application methodologies for logic programming with ordered disjunction. An answer set programming methodology for configuration tasks has been developed in a number of papers by Niemelä and colleagues at Helsinki University of Technology (Soininen 2000; Niemelä & Simons 2000). We plan to study possibilities of combining this methodology with LPODs. Of course, the discussion of qualitative decision models in this paper was very preliminary. We plan to work this out in more detail in a separate paper.

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